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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays on exchange rates and prices. The first two 
essays are devoted to theoretical study, and the other is an empirical study. This research 
analyzes the strategic interactions between international firms. The first essay (chapter II) 
explores the relationship between price leadership and exchange rate uncertainty. The 
research investigates the incentives to lead and follow in a model in which exporting firms 
have the different degrees of exchange rate uncertainty. As exchange rate uncertainty 
increases, firms will take a flexible strategy as a dominant strategy. Over certain ranges of 
exchange rate variability, only one firm has a flexible strategy as its dominant strategy, and 
the other firm is induced to be a price leader, resulting in a dominant strategy Nash-
equilibrium. Which firm will be the price leader depends on the mark-up and substitutability 
of products. The particular attention of this research is also given to the implication of 
exchange rate variability for exchange rate pass-through. 
The second essay (chapter HI) focuses more on brand loyalty. In many markets, 
consumers who have previously purchased firom one firm have (or perceive) costs of 
switching to a competitor's product, even when the two firm's products are functionally 
identical. I explicitly analyze the effect of rival exchange rate for diverse cases (perfect 
foresight for exchange rates, imperfect foresight for exchange rates, perfect capital mobility, 
and imperfect capital mobility). In the case of the imperfect foresight, the exchange rate 
pass-through is affected by exchange rate uncertainty. Due to the brand loyalty, current price 
decisions will affect future profits through market shares. The expected future profit is 
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affected by expected competition situations that depend on the interactive movement of 
future exchange rates. 
In the last essay (chapter IV), I test the strategic behaviors between exporting firms 
with simultaneous estimation techniques (three stage least squares). Exchange rate pass-
through is estimated, and the effect of the rival exchange rate is emphasized. Also, I 
demonstrate the problem associated with tests which use a trade-weighted exchange rate. 
Most importantly, this research highlights the importance of market structure in exchange 
rate pass-through studies. 
1 
L GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
LI Introduction 
Since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods agreement in the spring of 1973, a 
considerable increase in the variation of bilateral exchange rates has occurred. For example, 
the dollar-mark rate has fluctuated by as much as 20 percent within periods of several months 
or less. Figure I-l shows the fluctuations of exchange rates in the major currencies per U.S. 
dollar from January 1975 to November 1998.' Such fluctuations have raised many questions 
and studies in relation to exchange rate uncertainty and changes; how much have the risks 
associated with international transactions increased and what impact has the increase in risk 
had on those transactions? In another side, how have the changes in the exchange rate 
influenced international firms' pricing behaviors (i.e., exchange rate pass-through)? The 
fields related to exchange rate movement that have been studied and analyzed by theoretical 
and empirical researchers are very broad. 
The studies on the interaction of exchange rates and prices are important not only for 
what it may tell us about competition in international trade, but also because of its 
implications for the effect of currency appreciation or depreciation on the trade balance. In 
recent years, the existence of large and persistent external imbalances in many countries has 
prompted a new debate on the role of exchange rate changes in balance-of-payments 
adjustment processes. In the countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism of the 
' Major currencies are Japanese yen, Canada dollar, U.K. pound, and Germany deutschmark. They are 
normalized in the following way; (nominal exchange rate - mean)/standard deviation. 
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Figure I-l. Trends of the major currencies per U.S. dollar normalized 
European Monetary System, insistence on keeping nominal exchange rates fixed and on 
avoiding parity realigimients is apparently predicated on the idea that exchange rate changes 
can not durably alter relative price competitiveness, or else that price competition is not a 
determinant factor. Similarly, the dramatic evolution of the exchange rates of major 
currencies over the last ten years seems to have had but a very modest impact on the external 
balances of those countries. 
The existence of a stable relationship between exchange rates and traded good prices 
on the various national markets is an essential ingredient in external adjustment processes 
and a major channel of international transmission mechanisms. Recently, several theoretical 
analyses have questioned the traditional hypotheses about the repercussion of exchange rate 
variations on traded good prices. In general, hov^^ever, empirical tests of the various rival 
hypotheses have not been very conclusive, mainly due to the fact that they have been 
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performed on aggregate trade price data; aggregation tends to alter the statistical 
characteristics of individual price series. In order to circumvent some of these difBculties, I 
study firms' pricing behaviors at the level of specific industries. 
Internationally traded manufactured goods are typically viewed as being highly 
differentiated and mainly sold in imperfectly competitive and segmented markets where 
arbitrage is costly, and mostly unprofitable. There is a considerable amount of empirical 
evidence to support this view about manufactured goods.^ The theory of intra-industry trade 
of Krugman (1979), Lancaster (1980), and Helpman (1981) lends further support to the view 
that most traded manufactured goods are imperfectly substitutable. Therefore, the perfect 
competition model and monopoly model may have some limitations in understanding the real 
world of trade. 
Nevertheless, there is little research that investigated the effect of exchange rate 
uncertainty using an imperfect competition model. Moreover, most existing literature ignores 
or strongly restricts the demand side of export and the competition situation in the export 
market. Based on this observation, I analyze the effect of e.xchange rate uncertainty on 
international trade using a model of imperfect competition. Furthermore, my model allows 
me to study the effect of rival's exchange rate considering the demand of export explicitly. 
There is no oligopoly literature that considers a rival's bilateral exchange rate, ignoring the 
possible situation that an exporter faces other foreign firms as rivals. Because the models in 
the existing literature deal with a foreign firm and a domestic firm, only a single bilateral 
exchange rate is involved in. However, if other foreign firms exist in the market, the rival 
^ See Norman (1975), Isard (1977), Knetter (1989), Marston (1990), and Kasa (1992). 
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countries' exchange rates and exchange rate variabilities also may affect the firm's strategic 
behavior. 
On the other hand, the theoretical advances in the exchange rate pass-through 
literature can be viewed as an off-shoot of recent developments in the broader literature that 
aims to incorporate factors such as imperfect competition, product differentiation and the role 
of market structure (for instance, Dombusch, 1987; Krugman, 1987,1989; Baldwin,1988; 
Baldwin and Krugman, 1989; Dixit, 1989a, 1989b; Fischer, 1989; Froot and Klemperer, 
1989). However, these exchange rate pass-through studies also ignore the effect of rival 
exchange rate in their models. I will analyze the exchange rate pass-through issue, 
considering explicitly the change of rival's exchange rate, and show that ignoring the rival 
exchange rate movement can mislead the empirical studies of exchange rate pass-through. 
My model is different firom earlier studies in several regards. First, unlike other 
studies, essays in this dissertation deal with two or more foreign firms, including two or more 
bilateral exchange rates. Although the existence of domestic firms does not change the main 
economic points, I implicitly assume that the substitutability between export goods is much 
higher than the one between the export goods and the domestic good. Indeed, in the 
international export market, an exporter may face other foreign firms rather than domestic 
firms as major rivals. Then, we can analyze the effects of own and rival's exchange rates and 
their variabilities through the strategic interactions between international firms. Most of the 
literature ignored what could be called third-country effects. Second, a new industrial 
organization theory, focusing on game-theoretic analysis of the strategic behavior of rational 
agents within markets and firms, is applied to the international trade issues. Most of world 
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trade is in the products of industries that we have no hesitation in classifying as oligopolies 
when we see them in their domestic aspects. However, only a handful of papers have 
attempted to apply models of imperfect competition to international trade issues. Finally, in 
this dissertation I incorporated the exchange rate uncertainty issue into my model. 
Introduction of uncertainty represents a step towards greater realism. In a regime of fixed 
exchange rates or flexible exchange rates but with fully anticipated changes the differences 
between international transactions and domestic transactions have no real consequences for 
the behavior of exporters and importers of commodities. However, for more than a decade 
there has been a significant increase in exchange rate volatility which may affect international 
trade and pricing decisions. 
1.2 Dissertation organization 
This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays. Each essay contains its own 
introduction, sections on theory and applications, and conclusion. All references are in one 
reference section at the end of the dissertation. The first two essays are devoted to theoretical 
study, and the third is an empirical study. In the first essay (chapter 11), I study the 
relationship between price leadership and exchange rate uncertainty. The paper investigates 
the incentives to lead and follow in a model in which exporting firms have different degrees 
of exchange rate uncertainty. Focusing on brand loyalty, the second essay (chapter HI) 
investigates exchange rate pass-through under exchange uncertainty. In many markets, 
consumers who have previously purchased from one firm have (or perceive) costs of 
switching to a competitor's product, even when the two firm's products are functionally 
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identical. Finally, in the third essay (chapter IV), I test the strategic behavior between 
exporting firms with simultaneous estimation techniques (three stage least squares), using 7-
digit TSUSA (Tariff Schedule of the United States Annotated) data. Exchange rate pass-
through is estimated, and the effect of the rival exchange rate is emphasized. 
13 Literature review 
1.3.1 Price leadership 
The recent literature on price leadership has identified a number of factors facilitating 
the existence and identification of a price leader. Holthausen (1979) provided a model in 
which the major determinant of the identity of a leader is the firms' attitudes towards risk. In 
his model, there are n+1 firms, each having a concave von Neumann-Morgenstem utility 
fimction with profit as the argument. Firms also sell in product markets other than the one 
under consideration. Each firm may decide whether to continue charging its original price or 
to change its price under the uncertainty of rival firms' action. Holthausen (1979) showed 
that if all firms have a common utility fimction U, which exhibits decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, the firm with the greatest profit from other sources (with the greatest profit cushion 
against possible loss) can best afford the role of price leader. The main result is that larger, 
less risk averse firms are more apt to gamble on changing prices than are smaller, more risk 
averse firms. 
Eckard (1982) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) examined the role of informational 
advantages in generating leadership. Eckard (1982) argued that firms with large market 
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shares will be relatively better informed about demand conditions and thus make its price 
response first. The cause of sudden unexpected change in sales caimot be immediately clear 
to the firm because such fluctuations in firm and industry demand occur normally due to both 
random event and demand change. With an assimiption that information available to the firm 
regarding current industry demand is only its own recent sale experience, the lower the firm's 
share, the higher is the variance of its industry sales estimate because of uncertainty regarding 
its actual share of industry sale or, alternatively, a lack of knowledge of the sales experience 
of other firms relative to its own. Thus, smaller firms in the industry which take a long time 
to detect shifts in industry demand occasionally follow the leader. While Eckard's (1982) 
study did not use an analytical tool, Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) modeled a differentiated 
product duopoly in which the firms are asymmetrically informed. The characteristic of their 
model is that since the designated price leader typically earns higher profits, it might be 
expected that both firms would vie for the leadership position. This characteristic is due to 
the assumption of a shock which is beneficial to one firm and harmfial to the other firm. The 
more informed firm, acting as a price leader, picks prices which raise its own profits at the 
expense of overall industry profits. At that time, the less informed firm prefers to be a 
follower if the variance of a common disturbance (which has the same effect on both 
demands) exceeds three times the variance of an idiosyncratic disturbance (which raises the 
demand of one firm by the same amount as it reduces the demand for the other firm). The 
benefit fi-om information is dominant over a follower disadvantage. 
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) focused on size, as measured by capacity, as a 
determinant of leadership. They analyzed duopolistic price leadership games in which firms 
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produce a homogenous good and have a capacity constraint. They showed that when 
capacities are in the range where the simultaneous-move price setting game (with efficiently 
rationed demand) yields a mixed-strategy solution the large firm is indifferent between being 
a leader, a follower, or moving simultaneously. However, the small firm, while indifferent 
between being a leader and moving simultaneously, strictly prefers to be a follower. This 
motivates the discussion of games of timing with ex-post inflexible prices in which the large 
firm becomes an endogenously determined price leader. Deneckere, BCovenock and Lee 
(1992) further applied the notion of Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) by considering a price 
setting game in which firms have loyal consumer segments, but cannot distinguish them from 
price sensitive consumers. They constructed two games of timing of price announcements 
with ex-post inflexible prices in which the firm with the larger segment of loyal consumers 
becomes an endogenously determined price leader. 
Although Albaek (1990) and Spencer and Brander (1992) considered a quantity game, 
rather than a price game, with cost uncertainty and demand uncertainty respectively, their 
studies are more comparable to our research, but they are different in some important 
respects, as described later in this paper. Albaek (1990) showed that a natural Stackelberg 
situation exists (does not exist) both when the goods are substitutable and when they are 
complements if quantities (prices) are the strategies. However, the results of Albaek (1990) 
are dependent on the assumption that information sharing is prohibited and their cost 
variances are sufficiently different. The firm that faces the large variance of cost is willing to 
be a quantity leader and reveals their cost structure to the rival. Then, under some conditions 
the other firm may prefer being a follower because he can explore the cost uncertainty. 
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Spencer and Brander (1992) considered several related strategic duopoly settings in 
which demand uncertainty creates an 'option value' from retaining flexibility by delaying 
investment or output decisions until after uncertainty is resolved. The value of flexibility 
must be weighed against the strategic value of pre-commitment, yielding a trade-off between 
flexibility and pre-commitment. They derived the conditions for Nash equilibrium with a 
linear demand and a homogeneous good. They also considered the possibility of endogenous 
Stackelberg leadership with firm specific marginal cost uncertainty. However, the emergence 
of Stackelberg leadership is not completely straightforward. It is not the case that simply 
allowing high variance for one firm and low variance for the other will lead to commitment 
by the low variance firm and flexibility by the high variance firm. 
1.3.2 Theoretical studies on exchange rate pass-through 
The theoretical explanations of incomplete exchange rate pass-through (PT) have 
emphasized the role of market structure first, followed by production differentiation. In this 
section, I concentrate on exchange rate pass-through theories rooted in imperfect 
competition.^ In an imperfectly competitive market, price is not set at marginal cost, and 
firms take a position to charge a mark-up on costs, which may lead to above normal profits 
even in the long run. The important issue is how this mark-up over marginal cost might vary 
in response to an exchange rate change. 
^ Menon (1995) reported the many empirical supports for the claim that imperfect competition prevails in 
international trade markets. 
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Dombusch (1987) considered a Coumot oligopoly model to focus on features of 
market stmcture and explored Dixit and Stiglitz's (1977) and Salop's (1979) models to 
capture the effect of imperfect substitutability and product differentiation on the price 
response to exchange rate changes. First, Dombusch (1987) considered the case of a Coumot 
industry with a linear demand curve and constant marginal costs, and showed that the degree 
of pass-through is positively related to the ratio of the number of foreign firms to total firms 
and on the total number of firms. Then, with the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model and Salop's 
(1979) model he found that the degree of pass-through is directly related to the degree of 
substitutability between the domestic and imported goods. However, unlike my model, there 
exists only a bilateral exchange rate in his model because the foreign firms come from the 
same source country. 
Close review of the Coumot oligopoly literature (Dumbusch ;1987) may be useful 
because it is probably the most widely accepted benchmark. There are n domestic suppliers 
and n foreign firms with respective sales of q and q* per firm. The profit of each firm is 
given by: 
Yl = {p-w)[a-bp-{n-\)q -n'q']  for domestic firms, 
n* I  e-w'  )[a -bp-nq- {n -1)^' ] for foreign firms, 
where w (w*) = constant marginal cost of domestic (foreign) firms. Assuming firms 
simultaneously choose output levels, it is readily shown that the common equilibrium price in 
the industry is given by: 
p = {nw + n ew')  I [N •¥ a  I bN\,  N = n + n'  + \ .  
The elasticity of the equilibrium price with respect to the exchange rate is: 
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n ew 
<P = { .  X )• 
n +n+1 p 
We can see that the degree of pass-through is an increasing function of the ratio of foreign to 
ew' domestic firms and hm (p = < 1.  
Silbert (1992) extended Dombusch's (1987) analysis with general demands and linear 
cost curves and examined the effects that different degrees of collusion (e.g., Coumot 
behavior, joint profit maximization, and competitive firm behavior) and market shares of 
foreign firms have on pass-through. Sibert (1992) found that Dombusch's result that pass-
through is increasing in the number of foreign firms generalizes to a variety of behavioral 
assumptions. 
Fischer (1989) considered the case where firms are Bertrand competitors (or Nash 
price setters) with a homogeneous good and where foreign firms produce for both the home 
and export market and can not price discriminate. The timing of firms' decisions is as 
follows. First, firms simultaneously announce binding offer prices in their own currencies. 
After the exchange rate is realized, world demand is allocated to the best offer. He found that 
given an expected appreciation, expected pass-through is seen to be higher if the domestic 
market is monopolistic relative to the foreign market; or home monopoly tends to increase 
pass-through while foreign monopoly tends to decrease it. 
More recent iimovations have extended the oligopoly pricing literature as it relates to 
exchange rate by focusing on ways of incorporating international competitive pressures into 
the determination of the optimal price. Froot and Klemperer (1989) investigated the pass-
through from exchange rates to import prices when firms' future demands depend on current 
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market shares and consider how temporary versus permanent exchange rate changes effect 
this decision. They employed a simple two-period model where market share in the first 
period will affect the price response to an appreciation in the second period. They showed 
that while foreign firms may either raise or lower their dollar export prices when the dollar 
appreciates temporarily (i.e., the pass-through may be perverse), an appreciation viewed as 
permanent leads to foreign firms pricing very aggressively to gain an increase in market 
share. 
Tivig (1996) extended Froot and Klemperer (1989) by deriving a sufficient condition 
for perverse pass-through and a necessary condition for normal pass-through. These 
conditions become necessary and sufficient under the (possibly more realistic) assumption of 
imperfect capital mobility and they are robust to changes in the game structure (e.g., they do 
not hinge on the assumption of open- or closed-loop pricing). He also analyzed explicitly 
future, i.e. second-period, price effects of a temporary change in the exchange rate. Whereas 
the price of the domestic product preserves its initial direction of change, the price change of 
the imported good is partially reversed in the second period. 
The approach that emphasizes dynamic and inter-temporal behavior also underlies the 
"hysteresis" models of pricing (Baldwin, 1988; Baldwin &, Krugman, 1989; Dixit, 1989; 
Krugman, 1989). These models investigate the circumstances under which a temporary 
exchange rate fluctuation is likely to cause a permanent (and maybe hysteretic) price change. 
Since price reactions are usually derived from changes in aggregate supply via entry or exit of 
competitive firms, the focus is on entry and exit instead of strategy. The hysteresis effect 
suggests that competition in the market will remain unchanged as long as exchange rates 
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fluctuate within a set band, and that this band will be greater the higher the costs associated 
with entry and exit (i.e., irretrievable sunk costs). This will result in a lower rate of exchange 
rate pass-through as firms fight to either stay in the market or deter entry. If the exchange 
rate moves outside this band, however, then the entry and exit decisions which follow 
permanently alter the structure of the market. That is, the new firms that have entered the 
market will not leave easily, and the firms that have left may never re-enter. This may 
produce a structural break in the observed pass-through relationship, as the new competitive 
structure of the market may not be consistent with the historical rate of exchange rate pass-
through. 
13.3 Empirical studies on exchange rate pass-through 
There have been over 50 published empirical studies on exchange rate pass-through 
over the last two decades. In those studies, a variety of methodology, model specification, 
variable construction and data were used. In this section, I will review the literature briefly 
rather than provide a comprehensive survey'*, paying attention to the used data and major 
findings. 
1.3.3.1 Data used 
In the previous empirical studies there have been few attempts to test exchange rate 
pass-through at lower levels than the two-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification), SITC 
(Standard International Trade Classification), ISIC (International SIC), or TSUSA (Tariff 
Schedule of the United States Annotated) levels. The use of this type of highly aggregated 
* Menon (1995) provided a broad and comprehensive survey of exchange rate pass-through literature. 
14 
data generates a problem with aggregation bias. This bias results principally from the 
heterogeneity of the products contained within such wide-ranging categories. Only a handful 
of the studies have attempted to examine somewhat more disaggregated data. While Dunn 
(1970); Kreinin, Martin and Sheehey (1987); Hooper and Maim (1989) tested the exchange 
rate PT with 3- to 4- digit SIC, Feenstra (1989), Knetter (1989), and Marston (1989) used 5-
to 7- digit SITC. 
Many researchers pointed out a number of problems relating to the data used in 
previous studies. Those arguments relate mainly to the common resort to proxies such as unit 
values, and the lack of studies that use data disaggregated at the product level. Goldstein and 
Khan (1985) stated "... disaggregation is always better ..." if such data are available. They 
even complained that in most studies when the authors recognize a problem with aggregation 
bias there is no attempt to disaggregate beyond the one- or two-digit level of the data 
classification scheme being used. This is still a very high level of aggregation and calls into 
question the results of such studies. Marm (1989) observes that, "Most recent empirical work 
is grounded in models of imperfect competition, yet tested using aggregate data. This 
mismatch would be less worrisome if the industry and aggregate data behave similarly." This 
use of aggregate data to examine micro-level models is troublesome and leads to the decision 
to use 7-digit TSUSA data in the present study. 
Like the measurement of the import price, the measurement of the exchange rate has 
attracted some attention in the literature. The use of aggregated data has led researchers to 
utilize various types of composites, or baskets, of exchange rates of major trading countries 
as exchange rate variables in their pass-through models. Most studies employ a trade 
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weighted exchange rate index, highlighting the importance of factors such as the number of 
currencies included and the weighting schemes employed to construct this index. These 
factors are likely to bear significantly on the degree to which the index understates or 
overstates the exchange rate fluctuation. Only Athukorara and Mennon (1994) employ a 
currency-contract-weighted exchange rate. Meanwhile, some studies using disaggregated 
data use bi-lateral exchange rate. Since all exchange rates are bilateral by their nature and 
one of the objectives of my research is to examine import pricing behavior at more micro 
levels than previous studies, the decision was made to examine U.S. import prices on a bi­
lateral basis. Unlike other studies, my model employs rival exchange rates explicitly. 
133.2 Studies using aggregated data 
In the majority of studies, exchange rate pass-through (PT) is incomplete. Only a 
small number of studies reported complete or close to complete PT. However, there are 
significant differences in the estimates of PT reported in different studies for even a given 
country. The US is the best example of this since it has been so far the most thoroughly 
studied country. There are several studies that estimate the aggregate PT of exchange rate to 
import prices covering roughly the same period, starting aroimd 1970 and ending 1988. The 
estimates range from a low of 48.7 percent reported by Alterman (1991) to a high of 91 
percent reported by Helkie and Hooper (1988). Klein and Murphy (1988) and Mofifet (1989) 
reported 85% and 50% respectively. Given that there is little difference between these 
studies in terms of commodity or time coverage, the diversity in PT estimates would seem to 
stem primarily from differences in method, model specification and variable construction. 
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The multi-country studies mainly found significant differences in the exchange rate 
PT across countries. However, the multi-country studies provide conflicting results. BCreinin 
(1977) found that PT tends to vary inversely with the size of the country. The individual 
country estimates from import pass-through of a 10 percent depreciation are as follows; US -
50%, Germany - 60%, Japan - 80%, Canada - 90%, Belgium - 90%, and Italy - 100%. On the 
other hand, BChosla and Teranishi (1989) found that PT is almost complete for the larger 
economies such as the US and Japan (87% and 92%, respectively), but it was very low for the 
smaller economies such as Indonesia and the Philippines (27% and 17%, respectively). 
Spitaeller (1980) showed that long-run pass-through is complete for all countries (i.e., 
France, Netherlands, Japan, UK, and US), having an exception of Germany which remains at 
73 percent. 
1.3.3.3 Studies using disaggregated data 
Studies that have employed a disaggregated approach found that exchange rate pass-
through (PT) tends to vary quite significantly across industries or product categories. Branson 
and Marston (1989), Feenstra (1989), Knetter(1989), and Menon (1992, 1993) found 
significant differences in PT across products raising the concern of possible aggregation bias. 
For Japan exporting to the US market, Feenstra (1989) showed the PT ranged between 69.7 
% (for Truck) and 105.3 % (for Cycles), while Branson and Marston showed that PT varied 
quite significantly across 13 manufacturing industries, ranging between 20 and 50 percent. 
Only a small number of the disaggregated studies attempted to formally explain inter­
industry differences in PT. Kreinin et al. (1987) showed that PT is positively related to 
capital intensity and negatively related to labor intensity with annual 4 digit ISIC data for US 
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imports from the UK, Germany, and Japan. Meanwhile, Feinberg (1989, 1991) who studied 
PT to domestic prices reported that PT is much lower for highly capital intensive and 
concentrated industries and those protected by extensive barriers to entry. However, in the 
early paper (1989), an estimated coefiBcient of seller concentration is not significantly 
different from zero. Phillips (1988) attempted to explain inter-industry differences in PT 
using industrial organization variables, resulting in weak supports statistically. 
More highly disaggregated data such as 7-digit SITC level was employed by Feenstra 
(1989), Knetter (1989), and Marston (1989). Feenstra (1989) examined three U.S. imports 
from Japan that were disaggregated to an approximation of the 7-digit SITC level. Feenstra's 
regression equation included explanatory variables other than the exchange rate and its 
polynomial lags. For example, he included a proxy for foreign factor prices (Japanese 
domestic wholesale prices for each product as a surrogate for production costs), a proxy for 
income (total U.S. expenditure on each product through an instrumental variable), and a 
proxy for the price of a domestic substitute (U.S. consumer prices or the U.S. price of steel). 
For Japan exporting to the US market, Feenstra (1989) showed the PT ranges from 60.7 to 
105.4 %. His major finding was that pass-through of exchange rate and tariffs are symmetric. 
Marston (1989) showed that PT varied quite significantly across 17 manufacturing 
industries, ranging between -11 and 72 %. Marston used the export shares of each product to 
calculate a weighted average exchange rate variable based on the exchange rates of the major 
importers of the product. This means that he carmot determine if there are differences in 
pass-through behaviors across countries as all importing countries are treated as one. In his 
log-log OLS regression, all variables were expressed as first differences of their log values to 
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ameliorate problems with spurious correlation between variables. Marston did include 
explanatory variables other than the pass-through variables (e.g., foreign (non-Japan) 
industrial production). 
Knetter (1989) examined pass-through behavior for six U.S. exports and ten German 
exports at the 7-digit SITC level (the data for German exports were from German sources but 
were equivalent to the 7-digit SITC level). He used a panel data set consisting of export 
prices over time and across markets that allows him to control for shifts in the marginal cost 
of production that are unobservable but common to all markets and to isolate discriminatory 
country-specific effects. Knetter found that German export prices appear to be much more 
sensitive to exchange rate fluctuation. Adjustment tends to be stabilizing with respect to the 
local currency price in the destination market. However, the evidence indicates that U.S. 
export prices are rather insensitive to exchange rate fluctuations, and that when price 
adjustment does occur it frequently amplifies the effect of exchange rate fluctuations 
(perverse pass-through). 
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n. PRICE LEADERSHIP AND EXCHANGE RATE UNCERETAINTY: 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH 
n.l Introduction 
In general, if duopoly firms have upward-sloping (downward-sloping) reaction 
functions, each firm will prefer to be a follower (a leader); that is, in the price game, each 
firm prefers that the other firm is a price leader while it behaves as a price follower. It is well 
known, in the price game, there exist two Nash-equilibria (leader, follower; follower, leader). 
However, who will be the price leader is an open question. Nevertheless, there is a large 
institutional literature documenting the prevalence of price leader-follower behavior.' The 
existence and identification of a price leader has been a major research topic over the past 
decade. The recent literature on price leadership has identified a number of factors 
facilitating the existence and identification of a price leader, such as firms' risk attitude, 
information advantages, and market shares. 
In international trade decisions, a major source of uncertainty is due to exchange rate 
movements. Exporting firms based in different countries have faced notably large 
fluctuations in currency values, particularly since the advent of floating exchange rates. This 
chapter investigates the incentives to lead and follow in a model in which exporting firms 
have different degrees of exchange rate uncertainty. The preference of pre-commitment over 
a flexible strategy may depend upon the variances and covariance of exchange rates. I show 
that as exchange rate uncertainty increases firms will take a flexible strategy as a dominant 
' See Scherer (1980) and Rotemberg & Saloner (1990). 
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strategy, because the first mover advantage compared to the flexible Bertrand equilibrium 
will be dominated by the uncertainty disadvantage.^ Under high exchange rate variability, 
both firms have a flexible strategy as a dominant strategy and an eqtiilibrium in which neither 
firm commits its price will be a unique Nash-equilibrium (a dominant strategy Nash-
equilibrium). Meanwhile, over certain ranges of exchange rate variability only one firm will 
have a flexible strategy as its dominant strategy, and thus the other firm will be induced to be 
a price leader, resulting in a price Stackelberg Nash-equilibrium. Which firm will be the 
price leader depends on the mark-up and substitutability of products. I obtain a direct 
algebraic representation of the commitment cost in the case of linear demand and show that 
high levels of exchange rate uncertainty can change the Nash-equilibrium (NE). 
My model allows both firms the opportunity to move before uncertainty is resolved. I 
will be, therefore, able to characterize the conditions under which the first mover arises 
endogenously as a response to the trade-off between flexibility and commitment. I will show 
that asymmetries in firm-specific exchange rate uncertainty provide a natural reason for one 
firm to act before another does. 
The particular attention of this research is paid to the implication of pricing behavior 
and exchange rate variability for the short-run exchange rate pass-through. If the firm 
chooses the role of price leadership, exchange rate pass-through (PT) is zero by pre-
commitment.^ I will also show that the exchange rate PT with price leadership is less than 
that of a flexible Bertrand model. As the variability of exchange rates change, exchange rate 
^ See below for details and definitions 
' Of course, die expected change of exchange rate affects exchange rate PT. 
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pass-through varies because the game solution and the roles of firms are changed. As I show 
later, generally the larger is exchange rate variability, the larger is the exchange rate PT. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The basic model and game structure are presented 
in section 2. In section 3,1 derive the Nash-equilibrium, conditioning on variances and 
covariance of exchange rates, whereas section 4 constructs simulation studies. In section 5,1 
discuss the implication for short-run exchange rate PT and concluding remarks are provided 
in section 6. 
n.2 The model 
Let us consider a heterogeneous duopoly with price strategies in which a country j 
firm and a country k firm export the differentiated goods j and k to the third market (say 
U.S.), respectively. ^  For simplicity, I assume that the firms are symmetric except for 
exchange rates and marginal costs. The demand function for firm / is denoted as 
q, =a-bp, + cp^, where is own price in dollar, and is rival price in dollar. Hence, 
both goods are substitutes for each other, and further we assume each good is produced with 
constant marginal cost in own currency.^ Each firm's profit in local currency units is 
n, ={e,p,- d, )(a - bp, +cp^), where /, s = j,k i and e, is the exchange rate defined in 
units of country / currency per dollar. I make the following assumptions with respect to the 
model parameters: a,b,c,d, ,e, >0, b> c (the own price elasticity is higher than the cross 
price elasticity), and E[e, ] is normalized as one. I abstract from the shut down options by 
•* Although the existence of domestic (U.S.) finns does not change the main economic points, we implicitly 
assume that the substitutability between export goods is much higher than the one between an export good and a 
domestic good. Indeed, in the international export market, an exporter may face other foreign firms rather than 
domestic firms as major rivals. 
^ The foreign producer's home market is separated on the technological side and may thus be neglected. 
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assuming that both firms would always produce positive outputs. The only question is 
whether to pre-commit or wait. The firms are assumed to be risk neutral so that preference 
relations are determined entirely in terms of expected profits. There are two periods in the 
game. In the first period, each firm chooses either (I) to set its price, or (2) to wait to set 
price until the exchange rates are known. The outcome of this decision is known by its rival. 
In the second period, uncertainty is resolved and the remaining decisions are made. If both 
firms have ahready made price decisions, no further decisions are made, and sales take place. 
If only one firm has pre-committed its price, the other firm chooses its follower price. If 
neither firm pre-committed its price, each chooses its ex post Bertrand price level. 
Here, I use similar definitions with Spencer and Brander (1992). If both firms pre-
commit to price before uncertainty is resolved, then the price equilibrium will be of the 
Bertrand type. I refer to this as the 'committed Bertrand' regime. If both firms wait to price 
until uncertainty is resolved, then the price equilibrium will also be of the Bertrand type but 
with realized exchange rates. I refer to this as the 'flexible Bertrand' regime. If one firm 
commits its price before exchange rates are revealed, while its rival chooses price after 
exchange rates are revealed, then sequential rationality implies that the price equilibrium will 
be of the Stackelberg price leader-follower type. The firms are referred to as the committed 
leader and the flexible follower respectively. 
Four cases may occur because each firm has two options (commit and flexible). The 
possible cases are as in Table II-1. 
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Table n-l. Possible game structures 
Firm j Firm k 
Case A: pj,p^ ^ e^,e^ 
CaseB: Pj -> p^ 
CaseC: Pj 
CaseD: -> p^,p^ 
committed Bertrand 
committed leader 
flexible follower 
flexible Bertrand 
committed Bertrand 
flexible follower 
committed leader 
flexible Bertrand 
I examine and compare the ex ante expected profits for each case. For notational 
simplicity, I define some new variables as follows: 
d  =  , (geometric mean of marginal costs); p , = ^ ,  (price over marginal cost); 
p —d^ a  c  
X, =  y o ,  - 1  =  — ,  ( I  w i l l  c a l l  i t  m a r k - u p ) ;  ^  =  — , S = — , (approximation of 
a, ba b 
d 1 1 
substitutabil i ty);  n,  = — , (inverse of relative marginal cost); R, = — -1,  R' = E[— -1] ,  d, e, e, 
N'  = E[— -1], and S'  = £[-%-1] where i ,s  = j ,k  i  ^  s .  
6 e' 
Under the assumption that both firms pre-commit their prices, each firm's problem is 
Mar £[n, ] = E[bd^ (e, +e, - 1)(^, + -1 - X, + )], using the new definitions. 
The first-order condition of each firm is —" ' =2X, - ^~X^ - +1 = 0. 
<7 X, 
Solving the associated first-order condition yields the equilibrium X^-'' and expected profits. 
Similarly, if both firms do not commit their prices, each firm's problem is 
Maxn, = bd^(e,A', + e, -1)(^, + - I- X, + SX^nf), and the first order condition is 
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^ n, 2 J p 
-  „  = 2X, -  dn,  X^ — dn,  +1 - i? = 0. Then, we can get the equilibrium X' as a d A, 
function of the rival exchange rate, from an ex-ante perspective. We can thus obtain 
expected profits. 
Next, we examine the expected profit of the leader (0 and the follower (j) under the 
assumption that one firm commits its price before exchange rates are revealed, while its rival 
chooses price after exchange rates are revealed. This involves first setting out the decision of 
the price follower, whose maximand is: 
A/or = bd] {e^X^ + -1)(^, +37^ - I -  X^ + 5X,n]) . By solving the first-order 
condit ion,  we can get  the price fol lower 's  react ion function as  a  function of  X,:  
+dn]-\  + R,  + Sn':X,) .  (H-l)  
Ex ante, the leader maximizes 
E [ n , ]  =  E { b d : ie ,X,+e , - l )[<f>n,+Snf-\-X,+^Sn;i^ ,+Sn;-\  + R , +  Sn]X,)]} .  
Solving the associated first-order condition, we can get the equilibrium mark-up of the 
leader: 
, ,  S-X'-  '-  + ShfN'  ^  
2(2-5'; • 
Then, inserting equation (II-2) into equation (U-l), we can get the equilibrium mark-up of the 
follower: 
x,'-'- = xj--'-+^ixy - X!-'-)^^. (n-3) 
Table 11-2. Mark-up and Ex-ante profit for each case 
Mark-up Expected profit 
CommiUed 
Bertrand 
(Case A) 
Committed 
leader 
(Case B for 
firm j, case C 
for firm k) 
Flexible 
follower 
(Case (' for 
firm j, case B 
for firm k) 
FlcKible 
Bertrand 
(Case D) 
, , 4>(2^S)n,^S,C: +S^ -1 
2(2-S^)  
E[ Y \'r'] =  ( b d f ) ( x ! ' ) '  
r/./ l- /../. . . .2 ^(N' , )U2&,f  (4- ^ ) X !  '  /V,' _  £[n/-^] = £[n/']+M/{- 8(2-tf') 
^ Ein!  '  ]= E[n; '  ] + bdf  {Xj  '  SnfJ,  + . where J ,  e  
X r ' = X l ' . ^ ( X - ^ - X t > ) ^ \  4 2(2-<J') 
yK / .  .  y / . . / .  ,  
4-<y' 
E[nj- ' -]= E[ni ']+bd^[ ( 2 - s ' y  R ;  - 2 ( 2 - s ' ) S n : ( / ? :  - N ; ) + s ' n ; ( s ;  - I N ; )  2\2 (4-J^) 
, 2Sn!N:x!  '  ^ 
(4-<S^) 
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Fmally, we can get the expected profits inserting (11-2) and (11-3) into profit functions. 
Table 0-2 summarizes the equilibrium mark-up and expected profit of firm i in each case. 
For cases A and D both firms have the same one, whereas cases B and C will be interchanged 
with each other, because firms are synunetric. 
II.3 Nash-equilibrium and price leadership 
There exist two Nash-equilibria in the price game with certainty. Under certainty, 
each firm's best strategy changes, depending on its rival strategy. If the rival firm were to 
commit its price, then the firm would like to adopt a flexible strategy, because being a 
flexible follower is better than the committed Bertrand regime. Conversely, if the rival firm 
were to remain flexible, then the firm would like to commit, because being a committed 
leader is better than the flexible Bertrand regime. However, when exchange rate uncertainty 
is introduced, the two Nash-equilibria may be reduced to a unique Nash-equilibrium. The 
existence and identification of a price leader can be solved by introducing uncertainties. In 
this section, we study how the change in the exchange rate uncertainty (the variances and 
covariance of exchange rates) may alter the Nash-equilibrium. 
By inspection from the third profit equation of Table 11-2, it is clear that £[nf "^] is 
larger than £[nf ] independent of uncertainty because the second term on the right hand 
side is positive. Given that the rival firm wants to commit its price, firm i will choose to be a 
price follower. If ^[Ilf] is greater than £[nf], firm i's dominant strategy will be a non-
commitment strategy. Therefore, we need to compare £[nf '^] with From Table 
n-2, we calculate the following; 
E[n': ']-E[U'; ']  = bd^{ 
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2(2 - J')'/g; +<$«;(<?' -4^' H-8X^; - A^,')-2Ar;) 
2(4-^-)-
5^ , ,  ,  ,  SnfSN^X'- ' -
;4->i »• 
The uncertainty terms such as , and S' depend on the distribution of the 
exchange rate, while they result in zero under certainty. Thus, with certainty, £[nf] is 
bd;S\X!••'•)-
greater than E[Il ,  ] because every term except a negauve term (- ————) 8(2-^ ) 
vanishes. However, with exchange rate uncertainty the terms involving R',  N' , and S'  can 
make £[nf -^] > £[nf '']. 
For further analysis, I assume the random shocks of exchange rates follow a bivariate 
log-normal distribution.^ Under a bivariate log-normal distribution, R' = Var[e,] ,  
Var\e ] —Cov[e ,e ] (l + VarfeAy 
N '  = —— —, and S '  =  ——-—-—^—r-r -1 - Under these assumptions, 
l  + Cov[e, ,eJ (l + Cov[e,,eJ)-
equation (11-4) can be reduced to equation (11-5). 
® For the convenience of analysis, I assume the bivariate log-normal distribution. However, the use of other 
distributions such as bivariate normal distribution does not change the nnajor results. 
2 2 
^lf(x,y)= (lne,,IneJ-A/^(//^,//^,a-;,a-;,cr,^), E[e,] = Exp[fj^ +-^]=l,and £[ej = Exp[fi^ +-^] = U 
2 JJ.2 
then E[e"ef ] = exp[-^(a '  -  a) + {J3'  - /?) + ap<j„]. Using the facts that 
Var[e, ] = E[ef - 1] = exp[<T^ ] - 1, and Cov[e, ,e, ] = E[e,es - I] = ~ ^' we can get: 
R: =E[R,]= E[~ -1 ]  =  exp[o - ; ] -1  =  Kar[e , ] ,  AT, '  =  £ [ -^_  i ]  =  exp[o - ;  -a^]-l= ^ 
e, e, l + Cov[e,,eJ 
and 5," = E\^- 1] = exp[3o-;- la ]-l  = '  
e; (\ + Cov[e, ,e,])-
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S ' j X , ( 2 - S ' y -
8(2-S^)  '^ i4-S-)-  '  
+ 
C(l + rj 
dh; (J - 4S^ + 8) + 2S'n* K' +^K'  +K-2KC+c^ (i + Q' 
2(4-^-)-
(n-5) 
where = Farr[e, ] and C = Cov[e, ,e J. Although the effects of different marginal costs and 
covariance will be analyzed in the later simulation study, I here assume expected marginal 
costs are the same (or n,=l) and the covariance is zero. With these assumptions, equation 
(n-5) can be reduced to equation (11-6). 
Equation (11-6) consists of three effects. The first term (t/,) on the right hand side 
shows a leader advantage when the rival firm does not commit its price, implying that 
E[nf"^ ] is greater than ^[nf ] under certainty. The second term (C/,) reveals the effect 
of the variance of own exchange rate, while the third and the fourth terms (t/j) reveal the 
effect of the variance of rival exchange rate on the follower advantage. Note that 
£[nf ] is a linear fimction of the variance of the exchange rate for the country 
firom which the firm comes, while it is a nonlinear function of the variance of the other 
j l -S-f  8(2-d-)5-  -2S'(4-5-
S(2-S^)  {4-3-)-^ '^  S(2-S-)(4-S-)-
+ 
= -U,+U,(V,)  + U,(VJ.  (n-6) 
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exchange rate. Although I study its sensitivity through simulations later, it can be seen that 
the effects of own and rival exchange rate variance are affected by S (the substitutability 
between goods) and X^''' (the mark-up on the good). The leader advantage (the absolute 
value of the first term: U^) increases as 5 and/or X^''' increase. The effect of own variance 
is negatively related to S, while the effect of rival variance is positively related to 
substitutability (5) and negatively related to mark-up (X^"''). Alternatively, as the 
substitutability between goods increases, the rival effect and the leader advantage increase. 
The positive relationship between { £[nf]} and the variances means 
that as uncertainty increases, the value of retaining flexibility by delaying the price decision 
increases. The comparison of these expected values indicates that there are four possible 
solutions that might emerge. The best strategy of each firm is determined, in part, by the 
action of its rival. Although a firm might want to be a price follower, unless its rival 
acquiesces by opting for the role of a price leader, it cannot achieve this result. Thus, we can 
derive Proposition II-1. 
Proposition II-l. Assuming that Varle,^ ] = 0, and costs and demands are symmetric, (a) if 
Max[U2 (Vj), (^^y)] < . there exist two Nash-equilibria (commit, non-commit; non-
commit, commit), the same result as with a standard Bertrand duopoly game. The existence 
and identification problem of a price leader remains, (b) if C/j ) < f/, <Uf(y^), then 
£[n^ '^ ] > ] and ]. Thus, firm j will have a non-commit strategy 
as a dominant strategy, andfirm k's best response is to be a price leader. A unique Nash-
equilibrium (non-commit, commit) with payoffs (11^'^, n^'^) results, (c) if 
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^2 (y,  )<U,<U^(yj) .  then E[U' ' /]  < E[n'- /  ] and E[Ul ' ' ]  > £[0^^^ ].  Thus,  f irm k  wil l  
have a non-commit strategy as a dominant strategy, and firm j is induced to be a price 
leader. A unique Nash-equilibrium (commit, non-commit) with payoffs 
results, (d) finally, if {V^), both firms will have a non-commit strategy 
as a dominant strategy, and a unique Nash-equilibrium (non-commit, non-commit) with 
payoffs results. 
Proof. 
If Far[e^]= 0,  and costs and demands are symmetric, then £"[11 ] = 
- C/, + f/, (Vj), and £[11^- Of] = -1/, + t/j ). The comparison of these expected 
values indicates that each firm's regime ranking can be changed by the variance of e^. Each 
firm's regime rankings are as shown in Table 11-3. 
The result follows by inspection firom Table II-3. When the rival leads, we know the 
firm's best response is to follow. Thus, if ), firm k has a non-commit strategy as 
a dominant strategy whereas if (V^), firm k's best response to follow (lead) is to lead 
(follow). Similarly, if t/, < )' finn j has a non-commit strategy as a dominant strategy 
whereas if t/, > C/, ), firm j's best response to follow (lead) is to lead (follow). Hence, if 
MaxlUj (Vj), C/j (Vj )]<(/,, two Nash-equilibria result whereas if (Vj) < C/, < t/, ) • 
firm j has a dominant strategy and (non-commit, commit) is a unique Nash-equilibriimi. 
Similarly, if Uj(Vj) < C/| <Ui(Vj), firm k has a dominant strategy and (commit, non-
commit) is a unique Nash-equilibrium whereas if MinlUj (Vj), (f^^)] > C/|, (non-commit, 
non-commit) is a unique Nash-equilibrium. I constmct ordinal pay-off matrixes indicating 
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Table II-3. Regime ranking' 
(1) Firm j's (which have a volatile exchange rate) ranking 
nu. n;-" 
u,>u,{y^)  4 2 1 3 
U, <U,{V,)  4 3 1 2 
(2) Firm k's (which have a stable exchange rate) ranking 
nr-' nr 
U,>U,{V^) 4 2 1 J 
U, <U,(V^) 4 3 1 2 
' The smaller number means the higher rank (or 1 means the best and 4 means the worst) 
how each firm ranks each possible timing combination. Firm j can commit its price or 
remain flexible, as can firm k, yielding Table 11-4. The first entry in each cell is firm j's 
ranking of that cell; the second entry is firm k's ranking. The bold letters in Table II-4 
indicate Nash-equilibria. 
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Table 11-4: Ordinal pay-off matrix' 
Firm k 
C NC 
C 
Firm j NC (n;\n^^) (n;-^ 
Case (a) Case (b) 
Firm k Firm k 
C NC C NC 
C (4, 4) (2, 1) C (4, 4) (3, 1) 
Firm j NC (1, 2) (3, 3) Firm j NC (1, 2) (2, 3) 
Case (c) Case (d) 
Firm k Firm k 
C NC C NC 
C (4, 4) (2, 1) C (4, 4) (3, 1) 
Firm j NC (I, 3) (3, 2) Firm j NC (1, 3) (2, 2) 
' The smaller number means the higher (or I means the best and 4 means the worst) 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition II-1 assumed that firm k does not face own currency exchange rate 
uncertainty, as would happen if k were a domestic firm. Thus, with one domestic and one 
foreign firm, the foreign firm j faces exchange rate variance, and the price leader will be 
determined in Proposition II-1. Next, allowing the variance of to be positive, we can 
general ize equation (n-6)  as  £[nf] = -U[ +U'2iVJ + U'j(VJ where i ,s  = j ,k  
and i^s. Note that U{ = C/f = f/, if costs and demands are the same. Then we can 
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generalize the Proposition II-l as Corollary II-l. 
Corollary II-1. Assuming symmetric costs and demands, (a) if 
Max\U{ (V^) + Uj (Vi XUiiK ) + ^ 3 )1 < ^1' Mash-equilibria (commit, 
non-commit; non-commit, commit), the same result as with a standard Bertrand duopoly 
game. The existence and identification problem of a price leader remains, (b) if 
(r , )  + (V^ )<U, < Ui {Vj)  + Ui (V,) ,  then E[U'/  ] > EiW-/  ] and 
E[n.^ '' ] < ]. Thus, firm j will have a non-commit strategy as a dominant strategy, 
andfirm k's best response is to be a price leader. A unique Nash-equilibrium (non-commit, 
commit) with payoffs results, (c) if 
t /*(F,)  + t /3*(F^)>t/ ,  >Ui(yj)  + UiiV,) , then £[n;-^] < £[nj- '"]  and 
£[nf ] > £[n[]. Thus, firm k will have a non-commit strategy as a dominant strategy, 
andfirm j will be a price leader. A unique Nash-equilibrium (commit, non-commit) with 
payoffs  results ,  (d)  f inally  i f  Min[Ui{y^)  + Ui(y,) ,U'(y,)  + U',{V^)\>U„ 
both firms will have a non-commit strategy as a dominant strategy, and a unique Nash-
equilibrium (non-commit, non-commit) with payoffs results. 
Proof. 
Assuming symmetric costs and demands, the comparison of these expected values 
indicates that each firm regime ranicing can be changed by variances of e^ and . The 
possible regime rankings are in Table II-5. The proof is followed by inspection from Table 
n-5 and similar to the proof of proposition II-l. 
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Table 11-5. Regime rankings' 
(1) Firm j's (which have more volatile exchange rate) ranking 
( / /  > U i  + £ / /  4 2 1 3 
ui  <Ui 4 3 1 2 
(2) Firm k's (which have less volatile exchange rate) ranking 
nl '  ul'' 
u1 >U'{ 4 2 1 'S J 
C/,* <f/* 4 3 I 2 
' The smaller number means the higher rank (or I means the best and 4 means the worst) 
Q.E.D. 
II.4 Simulation and sensitivity 
For a more definitive analysis, I perform some simulations. Four possible areas are 
analyzed, and how the areas are changed for different values of parameters (S and «,) is 
studied. The effects of rival variance and covariance on the areas are also studied. 
Figure 0-1 classifies four possible ranges, given that 6 = 0.9, Var[e,^ ] = 0, and costs 
and demands are symmetric. While the horizontal axis represents the mark-up (), the 
vertical axis represents In the area above (below) the thick jj line, is 
higher (lower) than as the thick jj line represents the locus such that £[n^ '^] 
equals ]. Similarly, in the area above (below) the light kk line in the figure, £"[nf] 
is higher (lower) than ]. Higher variance means more uncertainty (risk) and makes 
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the flexible strategy more valuable, increasing the commitment cost. Therefore, we can 
classify four possible areas as follows. 
Area (a): two Nash-equilibria exist; the area below both lines. 
Area (b): firm j has a dominant strategy (follow), and the unique NE = (non-commit, 
commit); the area that is above jj line and below kk line. 
Area (c): firm k has a dominant strategy (follow), and the unique NE = (commit, non-
commit); the area that is below jj line and above kk line. 
Area (d): both firms' dominant strategy is follow, and the unique NE = (non-commit, non-
commit); the area above both lines. 
To illustrate in more detail, consider an industry in which S and X'^ '' are 0.9 and 0.4 
respectively. If Varle^ ] < 0.079, two NEs exist. If 0.079 < Var^e^ ] < 0.129, firm j will be a 
price follower and firm k will be a price leader. And, if 0.129 < Var[e^ ], neither firm 
commits. Likewise, an industry in which ^  and are 0.9 and 1.4 respectively, two NEs 
exist in the range that Var{ej ] < 0.74 while firm j will be a price leader, and firm k will be a 
price follower respectively in the range that 0.74 < Var{e^ ] < 0.971. If 0.971 < Far[e^ ], both 
firms do not commit. 
The more volatile is the exchange rate, the more likely it is that firms do not want to 
commit. Figure II-1 shows that, in the low mark-up industries, the firm that faces a volatile 
exchange rate has a stronger preference for holding flexibility; whereas the firm that faces 
low (or no) exchange rate volatility has a stronger preference for holding flexibility in the 
36 
2 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
> 
•11 
kk 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0 
o 7 m to 1  ^ CO a> CM 
Xj 
Figure II-1. Firms' best regimes; ^ = 0.9 (] = 0, n, = I ) 
higher mark-up industries. Thus, in relatively competitive (low profit) industries the price 
leader is more likely to come from either the home country or a trading country whose 
exchange rate varies little, whereas in more profitable industries the price leader is more 
likely to come from a trading country whose exchange rate varies much. 
Figures II-2,3,4 and 5 illustrate how the best regime areas change when other factors 
such as S, Varle^], Covfe^.e^] and n^Cn^) change. By inspection from Figure 11-1 and II-
2, we can see that jj line dramatically shifts down, while kk line shifts down relatively little, 
as S decreases. The low level of substitutability gives firms monopoly powers which 
make the flexible strategy more valuable, and the interaction between firms less important. 
Thus, areas (b) and (d) are extended, and area (a) is shrunken. Meanwhile, area (c) 
disappears.* This is not surprising since the effect of rival variance decreases as the 
' Of course, area (c) can exist with very high mark-ups and variances. However, it may not feasible in the real 
world. 
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delta=0.7 
kk. delta=0.7 
delta=0.5 
O- kk, delta=0.5 
Figure II-2. Firms' best regimes; S = 0.7 vs. J = 0.5 (Var{ei^ ] = 0. =0 
substitutability of goods decreases. Area (c) exists only under large 5 and/or high mark-up.' 
Therefore, in the next simulation studies (Figure 11-3,4,5), particular attention is paid to area 
(b) instead of area (c), using ^ = 0.7. However, under high 5 and/or high mark-up, the area 
(c) may exist and the effects of Var[ei^}, Cov[e^ ] and rij) on area (c) are similar 
to the effects on area (b). 
The effect of increased Var[e^ ] is showed in Figure 11-3. When Var[e^ ] increases the 
kk line shifts down much while jj line shifts down relatively less. The result is that area (d) is 
extended, and areas (a) and (b) shrink, implying that a dominant strategy NE (non-commit, 
non-commit) becomes more likely. When Cov[e^ ,e^ ] increases the downward shift of kk 
' According to my simulation studies, if > 034 and Far[e^ ] > 0.13 under J = 1, and/or if A"> I and 
Kar[e^ ] > 0.45 under <5 = 0.9, area (c) may exist. Although it is an empirical issue, it seems that Fiar[e^ ] is not 
too big because £[e^ ] = 1. 
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line is larger than that of jj line, resulting in area (d) increasing, and areas (a) and (b) 
shrinking (Figure 11-4). Because firms have upward sloping reaction functions in the price 
game, it is natural that increases of Var[e^ ] and/or Cov[e^ ,6^ ] make a flexible strategy more 
valuable, and that the small difference between variances shrinks the leader-follower 
equilibrium area. 
Finally, Figure 11-5 shows the effect of different marginal costs across firms on regime 
areas. In this simulation, 1, 0.9, 0.7, implying n* = 1,1/0.9, 1/0.7 respectively (by 
definition). Because I analyze the possible regime areas for firm j's mark-up levels in this 
simulation, jj line does not shift as rij decreases. Meanwhile, when decreases kk line 
ii. vk=o 
kk. Vk=0 
-O-ii. Vk=1/5Vj 
a kk. Vk=1/5Vj 
Vk=1/2\/i 
A kk. Vk=1/2Vj 
Figure II-3. Finns' best regimes; change of Var[e^^ ] (^ = 0.7, Cov[e ,e^ ] = = I) 
/ly < 1 means that firm j is a high cost firm. 
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Figure II-4. Firms' best regimes; change of Cov[e^ ] (S = 0.7,Var[ei^ ] = —Varlej ],«, = 1) 
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Figure II-5. Firms' best regimes; change of {S = 0.7, yar[e^ ] = 0) 
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shifts up, resulting in area (b) extended and area (d) shrunken. It means that a low marginal 
cost firm has a lower likelihood of adopting a flexible strategy than does a high marginal cost 
firm. 
From the above simulation studies, some general conclusions can be reached. First, 
asymmetric exchange rate uncertainty can give rise to the endogenous emergence of a leader-
follower structure. The interesting areas are (b) and (c) that identify a price leader. Who will 
be a price leader depends on various parameters, and it is not axiomatic that the firm from the 
country with higher exchange rate variability is likely to be the follower. In area (b), a firm 
that faces a high volatile exchange rate will have a non-commit strategy as a dominant 
strategy, and a firm that faces a stable exchange rate is willing to be a price leader: a result 
that perhaps best coincides with intuition. If the firm k is a domestic firm and foreign firm j 
has large variance of exchange rate, the domestic firm will be a price leader. However, in 
area (c), the firm that faces a stable (volatile) exchange rate is willing to be a price follower 
(leader). Paradoxically, the volatile exchange rate is more likely to induce the firm from the 
other country to be the follower. This case is most likely when goods are close substitutes, 
and profit margins are large. Next, when one exchange rate is fairly stable and/or the 
covariance is small, the endogenous emergence of a leader-follower structure is more likely; 
whereas, if both exchange rates are volatile and/or highly correlated, a dominant strategy 
(non-commit, non-commit) solution emerges. Finally, a firm that has a larger marginal cost 
has a stronger propensity to be a price follower under uncertainty. 
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n.5 Implications to short-run exchange rate pass-through 
Exchange rate changes are usually perceived as cost shocks for a foreign firm 
producing in its home country and selling in its export market. When the exchange rate 
changes, the firm may choose to pass the cost shock into its selling prices; this price change 
is called exchange rate pass-through (PT). We saw that in the area (b) the firm that has a 
small exchange rate volatility is willing to pre-commit and will be a price leader while the 
firm that faces the high uncertainty of exchange rate wants to be a follower. Clearly, the 
leader's PT will be zero in the short run." We can also see that the follower's exchange rate 
PT in a price leadership equilibrium is less than the exchange rate PT with a flexible Bertrand 
equilibrium. From mark-up of Table II-2 we can get Table II-6 using the relationship that 
p ,  = ( 1  +  X , K .  
Table II-6. Equilibrium price for each case (with n, = 1) 
Price 
Committed Bertrand 
(Case A) L.L a + bd 
' 2b-c 
Committed leader 
(Case B for firm j, 
case C for firm k) 
lab + ac + 2b'd + bcdE[—] - c'd 
pL.F 
2(2b--c-) 
Flexible follower 
(Case C for firm j, 
case B for firm k) 
„F.L °  ^ 
P, — —— + —— 4- — P-
' 2b 2e, 2b 
Flexible Bertrand 
(Case D) 
^ , 2b-d bed 2ab + ac-i h 
_F>" _ ^1 
'  /lU- 2 46 — c 
" Of course, they will make pass-through for the expected change of exchange rate. 
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From Table II-6, we can compare the follower's exchange rate PT in a price 
leadership equilibrium with the exchange rate PT when a flexible Bertrand equilibrium 
^ ' g. d 1 1 . ^ p7 g. Vy^d 1 1 
prevail. r /. — _ r £. , and r /r — ., 2 2 f.f • Th^n, it is P, 2 e,  p ,  Ab -c  e,  p,  
d p^ '- e, d p'; '-' e, Ib-d d c'd 
clear that |— < |— because r- —= ^777^ ^>0 and 
<7 e, p,  o  e,  p,  Ab'-c  2 2(46"-c") 
around e, = E[e,  ]. Furthermore, with a flexible Bertrand equilibrium firms 
pass-through their price for the change of rival exchange rate. Although exchange rate PT for 
the change of rival exchange rate is zero for other equilibria, 
d p^ '' e, bed 1 1 
= r  r F < 0 -p,  • 4b -c  e,  p  • 
Intuitively, in the leader-follower model, the realized exchange rate will have only a 
direct effect on the follower's price, given the leader's price, whereas in the flexible Bertrand 
solution, firm i's price decision incorporates the indirect effect through the change of rival 
price due to the change of exchange rate. Since the reaction curves slope upward both firms 
adjust price in the same direction, leading greater price movements not only for the firm 
whose exchange rate has changed, but for the other firm as well. Although the model is all 
same, the solution differs and the exchange rate pass-through differs. The ranks of PT will be 
as follows: committed Bertrand = committed leader < flexible follower < flexible Bertrand. 
In the area (b), if the firm k is a domestic firm and a foreign firm] has a large variance of 
exchange rate, the foreign firm will be a price follower and PT will be smaller than one of 
flexible Bertrand model (in the area d). 
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Some general conclusions on short-run exchange rate PT can be reached. First, in 
most industries except high mark-up and/or high 5 industries'^, as exchange rate variability 
increases the PT will be higher through the change of the firms' best regimes. Alternatively, 
high variance country's PT will be higher than lower variance country's. Next, as both 
country's volatility increases a flexible Bertrand regime may emerge and the PT is likely to 
be even higher. Also, with a flexible Bertrand equilibrium firms pass-through their price for 
the change of rival exchange rate. The exchange rate PT is affected by rival volatility 
through the equilibrium structural change, as well as by the rival's realized exchange rate. 
The PT is changed by which country's firm is a rival because rival's uncertainty can change 
the equilibrium structure. For example, ceteris paribus, if a Korean firm competes with an 
Indonesian firm rather than a Canadian firm as a rival, the pass-through is higher than the 
other, assuming that Korean and Indonesian currencies are highly volatile while Canadian 
currency is stable. Finally, by inspection from Figures U-I and II-2, we conclude that in 
markets where there are less close substitutes, exchange rate PT is likely to be higher because 
follow is likely to be a dominant strategy under more moderate exchange rate variability. 
11.6 Conclusion 
In a simple model of price competition in a market with differentiated goods, 
symmetric costs, and linear demand curves, it is well known that there are two pure strategy 
Nash-equilibra, since each firm prefers to be a price follower, letting the other firm move 
If the mark-up of a good market is big, there exist area (c) instead of area (b) (see Figure 1). In the area (c), 
high variance country's PT will be smaller than lower variance country's in the short-run. However, as both 
country's volatility increases the PT is more likely to be higher. 
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first, even though both firms prefer to be a leader in the Stackelberg game to the flexible 
Bertrand outcome, hi this chapter I have shown that exchange rate uncertainty may lead to a 
unique NE. I also derived the NEs depending on the variances and covariance of exchange 
rates, substitutability between goods, and marginal costs. Even though the Nash-equilibrium 
is changed by various factors, a statement can be made. Over certain ranges of exchange rate 
variability only one firm will have a flexible strategy as its dominant strategy. Then, the 
other firm will be induced to be a price leader, resulting in a price leader-follower 
equilibrium. Which firm will be the price leader depends on the mark-up and substitutability 
of products. 
These considerations for leadership also provide some implications for short-run 
exchange rate PT. Generally, my model predicts that firms from countries with highly 
volatile exchange rate will have greater pass-through than those from countries with more 
stable exchange rate. Also, the PT is changed by which country's firm is a rival because 
rival's uncertainty can change the equilibrium solution of the pricing game. If both country's 
volatilities are high, the PT is likely to be higher. Exchange volatility may produce a 
structure break in the observed pass-through relationship, as the new game structure of the 
market may not be consistent with the historical rate of exchange rate pass-through. 
I obtained these results using a linear demand function and risk neutrality. Risk 
aversion would increase the importance of this effect. Nonlinear demands or non-constant 
costs could introduce ambiguities, and could magnify or diminish the effect of exchange rate 
uncertainty, but would clearly not undermine the basic economic points. 
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I focused on the variabilities of exchange rates. However, in the general content, it 
may be related to cost uncertainty.'^ Albaek (1990) showed that a natural Stackelberg 
situation does not exist if prices are the strategies. However, the results of Albaek rely on the 
assumption that information sharing is prohibited. If the information is public, similar but 
adverse conclusions can be derived. Alternatively, the firm that faces the large variance of 
cost wants to be a price follower and the firm that has a small uncertainty is willing to be a 
price leader. Spencer and Brander (1992), in the quantity game, considered the possibility of 
endogenous Stackelberg leadership with firm specific marginal cost uncertainty. However, 
the emergence of Stackelberg leadership is not completely straightforward and unstable. 
Although cost uncertainty in reciprocal form is complicated compared to marginal cost 
uncertainty, this research implies that, in the price game, the emergence of Stacklberg 
leadership is completely straightforward, different fi-om the case of quantity game. The 
difference between the price game and the quantity game is due to the different properties of 
reaction functions. In fact, an existing matured firm may have the low level of cost 
uncertainty while a new entrant or a growing firm faces the high level of cost uncertainty. It 
is not surprising that the existing, usually big, firm is a price leader in the real world. 
" If the firms' objective function is changed to El, = (p, )(a -6p, +cp^), it is related to cost uncertainty. 
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in. EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH IN AN INTERNATIONAL 
DUOPOLY MODEL WITH BRAND LOYALTY: THE EFFECT OF 
RIVAL EXCHANGE RATE 
ni.l Introduction 
Since tiie advent of floating excliange rates, firms based in different countries have 
faced notably large fluctuations in currency values. Exchange rate changes are usually 
perceived as cost shocks for a foreign firm producing in its home country and selling in its 
export market. When the exchange rate changes, the firm may choose to pass the cost shock 
into its selling prices; it is called exchange rate pass-through (PT). In general, it is widely 
observed that import prices in importer's currency move very little compared to movements 
in exchange rates (incomplete pass-through). 
A number of authors have studied the underlying relationship between exchange rates 
and prices of internationally traded goods trying to explain the imperfect pass-through. The 
theoretical literature distinguishes between exchange rate pass-through in the short-run and 
the long-run. Some studies have noted that while incomplete pass-through is very common 
in the short run, it does not carry through to the long-run, implying that complete pass-
through would prevail as some long-run equilibrium relationship between exchange rates and 
prices (for example, Blejer and Hillman, 1982; Dohner, 1984). These studies have identified 
a number of factors which may affect the pace of adjustment of trade prices to exchange rate 
changes: costs of changing prices, costs of changing supply, order and payment lags, lags in 
demand adjustment, and currency denomination of contracts, etc. 
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However, even in the long-run, it is at large observed that exchange rate pass-through 
is not complete, roughly ranging between 50 and 80 percent. We might expect exporters to 
sell their goods at a higher price in a country where currency appreciates than in other 
countries. The theoretical explanations of long-run incomplete pass-through have 
emphasized the role of market structure and product differentiation. The major contributions 
are Dombusch (1987), Krugman (1987,1989), Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and BCrugman 
(1989), Dixit (1989a, 1989b), Fischer (1989), and Froot and BClemperer (1989).' Meanwhile, 
Branson (1989) claimed that by ignoring the important role played by non-tariff barriers a 
significant explicator of the pass-through puzzle has been omitted. 
Although there has been much research on exchange rate pass-though, no literature 
paying attention to rival's exchange rate was found. The existing exchange rate pass-through 
(PT) literature is based on an imperfect competition model of a foreign firm and a domestic 
firm, including only a bilateral exchange rate. However, if other foreign firms exist in the 
market, the foreign firm's pricing behavior will be affected by rival countries' exchange rates. 
In the international export market, an exporter may often face other foreign firms rather than 
domestic firms as major rivals. Indeed, in some markets, there does not exist a domestic 
firm. Even when domestic firms exist, the substitutability between export goods may be 
much higher than the one between an export good and a domestic good. Then, rival 
exchange rate may give a significant effect to the firm's pricing decision through strategic 
interaction. The importance of strategic interaction in an export market was mentioned by 
Goldberg and Knetter (1997, p. 1265). 
' In chapter I we reviewed the literature more thoroughly. 
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International economists typically impose the Annington assumption - i.e., they 
assimie that products within an industry are differentiated according to the country of 
production. An extreme interpretation of the Armington assumption implies that 
goods produced in different countries represent different markets.... The 
competition from these other sources is accounted for by including the prices of 
substitutes in the set of demand shifters or rotators; but this treatment fails to capture 
the strategic interaction. 
In this chapter, I explicitly analyze the effect of rival exchange rate on exchange rate 
PT. First, in section 2,1 suggest the new analytical definitions of exchange rate PT with a 
simple duopoly model. The definition of PT is clear only in a two-country world with one 
exchange rate, but is less clear in a model with two or more exporting countries and with two 
or more distinct exchange rates. Next, I study the effect of rival's exchange rate with a 
variant of Froot and Klemperer's model (1989) in section 3. With the three new definitions 
of exchange rate PT, I will show the effects of rival exchange rates due to strategic 
interaction. When the rival's exchange rate moves in the same (opposite) direction with its 
own change, the PT is magnified (minimized). If the change of rival's exchange rate is in the 
opposite direction to the change of the firm's exchange rate and relatively large enough, the 
exchange rate pass-through is perverse even with elastic demand. In Froot and Klemperer 
(1989); Tivig (1996); and section 2 of this chapter, an unrealistic assumption, perfect 
foresight, is made. However, in section 4,1 drop this assumption and instead assume that the 
firm's pricing decision must be made before future exchange rates (but after current exchange 
rates) are known. Interestingly, vsath imperfect foresight we can see that PT is affected by the 
covariance and variances of both its own and rival's exchange rate. In section 5 some 
conclusions are drawn. 
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in.2 Exchange rate pass-through and the analytical definition 
When the exchange rate changes, the firm may choose to pass the cost shock into its 
selling prices. The elasticity of eqiiilibrium price with respect to the exchange rate is called 
exchange rate pass-through (PT). However, this verbal definition is not entirely clear, in both 
theoretical analysis and empirical study, if there are two or more exporting countries with 
different exchange rates. 
The existing exchange rate pass-through literature modeled only a foreign country and 
a domestic country, including only one bilateral exchange rate. In these models the definition 
of exchange rate PT is clear, and both an importing country and an exporting country face the 
same exchange rate pass-through: 
where p" = price of imported (or exported) good. 
If, however, two or more exporting countries exist, the definition of PT is not clear and may 
differ across counties even in the same industry. I show the new definition of PT with a 
duopoly model to emphasize the fact that the market structure is a significant explicator of 
exchange rate pass-through. No literature has considered the different expressions of PT 
across countries. 
There are three countries (j, k, and U.S) in a duopoly model in which a country j and 
a country k firm each export differentiated products to the U.S. market. Assuming that firms 
move simultaneously and that prices are the strategic variable, each firm's optimization 
problem is: 
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MaxW =ie p -r')q,{Pj,Pk), p, ^ ' ' ' 
MaxU" ={e^p^ -r ' ' )q^{Pj,Pt) ,  Pk 
(m-la) 
(m-ib) 
where y' is own currency marginal cost of producer i, and e, is an exchange rate defined in 
units of exporter i's currency per $. 
The first order condition will be: 
3 a da 
P, ^ Pj 
^ Pk ^ Pk 
The comparative static reactions to the changes in exchange rates are: 
"^Pj I 
dPk,  A 
n -
- n* n-' 
-n^ de je,  J 
where A = > 0 by a stability condition, and n'„ = 
From (in-3), we can get: 
dp J = Ade^ + Bde^^, 
dp^ = Ade^ + BdCj, 
n 'ul  _ -n;nt _ 
where ^ =3 =  '  , A =  ^ - ^ , a n d 5 =  ^  ' '  
^n' 
^ P, 
A ' ~ A ' A ' A 
Then, the exchange rate PT that each country faces are follows: 
dp, e de. e. 
Country j's PT; =— = {A + B——) —, 
dej  p ,  de,  p ,  
(m-2a) 
(m-2b) 
(m-3) 
(m-4a) 
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dpt e. Country k's PT; = = (A + B 
de^ Pi Pk 
(in-4b) 
Country U.S's PT ; = = [ 
dCj Pt  (in-5) 
where a = market share of country j, 
P = market share of country k, 
e-j- = trade weighted exchange rate(= ae^ + Pe^), 
PJ = trade weighted price (= op^ + Pp^). 
These new definitions and analytical forms include the effect of rival's exchange rate 
change explicitly. Equation (III-4) shows that, for the same change of own exchange rate, the 
exchange rate PT varies depending on the covariance between exchange rates. Although 
points a, b, c and d of Figure III-l represent the same change of (from to ), the 
exchange rate pass-through will be different due to different correlation between exchange 
rates. The point a indicates the highest correlation and yields the biggest exchange rate PT. 
It means that ignoring the rival exchange rate may introduce a serious bias, particularly in the 
empirical studies. For example, if Korean firms' major rivals are Japanese firms in the U.S. 
market, an empirical study that tests Korean firms' exchange rate PT to U.S. market without 
considering Japanese exchange rate will be biased. Furthermore, if the correlation between 
won/dollar and yen/dollar is significant, the bias is likely to be more serious. Equation (111-5) 
shows that the exchange rate PT varies, for the same change of trade weighted exchange rate, 
depending on which exchange rate changes the trade weighted exchange rate; or points e, f, g, 
and h of Figure 111-2 display different PT with the same change of ej. The analytical proof is 
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a 
b 
c 
d 
Figure m-l. The same change of own exchange rate; with changed rival exchange rate 
ifej- = c 
Figure 111-2. The same change of trade weighted exchange; from different sources 
(The slope of de^- = c line is decided by market share) 
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shown in Proposition III-1. Although many empirical studies use a trade weighted exchange 
rate and a price, the trade weighted exchange rate can introduce a serious bias. 
Proposition III-l. If firms are not perfectly symmetric, importer's exchange rate PT in 
terms of the trade weighted exchange rate varies with the vector of exchange rate changes. 
Proof 
By definition, e,- = ae^ + and pj. = cqpj + Pp,^. For a given change of the trade 
weighted exchange rate, we want to see how the composition of the exchange rate changes 
affects price. 
Let de-j. = ade^ + = c, (*) 
dpy - adpj + pdp^^ = a{Ade^ + Bde^) + PiBde^ + Ade,^), {**) 
where c = constant. 
Substituting (*) into (**) we can get: 
dpr\j^^^^ = [aA+(l-a)B-(Y^)B-aA]dej +[(y^—)5 +^]c 9^constant. (***) 
If A = A,B = B and a = — (symmetric firms), = + is independent of de,. 
However, if firms are not perfectly symmetric, equation (***) shows that dpj is affected by 
the composition of the exchange rate changes. Particularly, the more asymmetry, the more 
the trade weighted price can vary, for a given change in the trade weighted exchange rate. 
For example, assuming A = A,B = B trade weighted exchange rate is changed by the 
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exchange rate that a small market shared firm face, exchange rate PT will be bigger. 
Q.E.D. 
in3 Perfect foresight and exchange rate pass-through 
In this section, I study a two-period duopoly model with brand loyalty." In many 
markets, consumers who have previously purchased from one firm have (or perceive) costs of 
switching to a competitor's product, even when the two firm's products are flmctionally 
identical. Examples of switching costs include the learning cost incurred by switching to a 
new make of computer after having leamed to use one make, and the transactions cost of 
closing an account with one bank and opening another with a competitor. Another kind of 
switching cost arises when uncertainty about product quality makes consumers reluctant to 
switch to untested products. These brand loyalties give firms a degree of market power over 
their repeat-purchasers, and mean that firms' current market shares are important 
determinants of their ftiture profits. This model is a variant of Froot and Kiemperer (1989) 
and Tivig (1996). However, in my model, two different bilateral exchange rates are involved 
because each firm is based in a different foreign country. I also distinguish three different 
PTs by the new definition of section 2. 
There are two firms: a country] firm and a country k firm, which compete with 
differentiated products in the export (say, U.S.) market.^ Own currency marginal costs of 
' Kiemperer (1995) explained and illustrated the different types of switching costs, or reasons for "brand 
loyalty", that consumers may face. 
^ Although the existence of domestic (U.S.) firms does not change the main economic points that the PT is 
affected by rival's exchange rate, we implicitly assume that the substitutability between export goods is much 
higher than the one between an export good and a domestic good. 
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producer j and k are and , respectively.'* Consumers are assumed to exhibit a certain 
brand loyalty. Demand and thus profits in the second period depend on first-period sales. 
Firms behave noncooperatively and act simultaneously. 
The export firms' problems will be: 
Maxn^ = {eJ^p ^ -Y')q,AP,\.Pkx) +^'[(ey2/'y2 (in-6a) Pii-Pii 
Maxn* =(&*,;?*, -/*)9*2(*^*'/^y2'Pi2)]. (in-6b) PkX.Pn 
where X = discount factor of firm i, 
e„ = t-period exogenous exchange rates defined in units of country / currency per 
dollar, 
= price of good / in period t, 
= quantity demanded for good / in period t, 
S' = market share of firm / in period I. 
The subgame of period two is solved first. In period two, the second-period dollar prices are 
chosen to maximize the own currency second-period profits : 
Maxn^ =(e 2-Y')qJ2{S'{pJ^,p„^),Pp_,p„.), (in-7a) 
p,i ' ' ^ 
M a x n t  = ( ^ 4 , ^ 4 2 .  ( m - 7 b )  Pkl 
Solving the associated first order conditions for the problems in (HI-?), the second-period 
equilibrium prices are derived as fimctions of first-period prices, second-period exchange 
rates and second-period own currency marginal costs. The reduced form solutions are the 
folio wings: 
•* The foreign producers' home market is separated on the technological side and may thus be neglected. 
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p'j2 = ^ (in-8a) 
p'k2 = Pk2iPj\'Pki,ej2y^k2,r',/') • (m-sb) 
In the first period, firms maximize the present discoxmted value of own-currency 
profits by choosing the first-period prices: 
Maxn^ =(e,iPyi -r')qj\iPj\yPkx) (in-9a) Pi\ 
MaxFI —{^klPkl~y )^k\^P j\y Pk\^ ^ ^2\.^ ^P]\yPk\^->P]2'>Pk2'<^k2^'> (III-Qb) Pk\ 
where FI, = second- period own currency profits of firm /. 
The first order condition will be: 
" = Pji-^^jO-r' j-r+^ = 0, (in-i oa) 
^p,\ o p,\ o Pj\ 
^ Pk\ ^ Pk\ ^ Pk\ 
d n; d n; ds' d n; a p]. 
It is assumed that ——^ = [ . ' — + —f——-] < 0 holds; or the first 
^ P.i <9S d /?„ a p,, a /7„ 
negative term dominate the second positive term.^ Therefore, firms choose lower prices than 
they would if market share had no value. It is further assumed that the second order 
conditions for profit maximization are fulfilled, and that the actions of the duopolists are 
strategic complements, i.e. the marginal profit of an own price increase rises with a higher 
price of the rival: — s > 0, i, s = j, k, i?^ s. 
^ Pa^ Ps\ 
' See Froot and Klemperer (1989). 
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To calculate the comparative static reactions for the changes of exchange rates, we 
differentiate (HI-10) and get: 
dPji  1 
dPki. A 
n* -
'•^jk 
-n 
A 
C 
where A = >0 by a stability condition and 
Pji^ ^ Pji^ ^ki  
, d-u\ , 
- '—de,,+-
^ Pkl^ ^kl  '  ^  PkX^ ^J2 
de,,]. 
Then, we obtain the comparative static: 
1 o^Y\^ o^Y\^ 
=-{nU„U/ -[nU^ . _ , _ /. ]de„ 
^  Pj\^ ^J2 ^ Pk\^ ^p. 
^ Pk\^ ^kl d Pji^ S^2 
c^Yl^ 
(m-11) 
+ (1 - e', )de,, + }' (°I-I2a) 
(m-12b) 
^ ^ ^ Pkl^ ^J2 
The third and fourth terms of (111-12) reflect the effect of rival's exchange rate change. 
If these terms are zero, the expression will be similar to Froot and Klemperer's (1989) and 
Tivig's (1996). However, if the change of exchange rate comes from the U.S. policy (e.g., an 
increase in the money supply in the U.S.), Cov(e^, ,e^,) will be generally positive and the 
third and fourth terms will be significant. Also, when the change has its origin in rival 
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country's domestic policy, rival's exchange rate may change without any change of its own 
currency value relative to dollar. My model suggests that the price may be changed by rival's 
exchange rate even when there is no change of its own exchange rate. A major and indeed 
important factor for exchange rate PT has simply been missed. If rival's (third country) 
exchange rate is not considered, theoretical analyses are misconceived and empirical studies 
are biased and inefficient.^ Particularly, empirical tests based on a bilateral trade and an 
exchange rate may face serious mis-specification problems if rival exchange rate is not hold 
as a constant. We first analyze it for four cases when imperfect capital mobility is assumed,^ 
differently from Froot and Klemperer (1989). 
[1] Temporary change of only. 
=0 (or Cov(e^,,ei,) = Cov(e^,,e^2) = C'ov(e^,,e4,) =0). 
Then, the comparative static will be: 
where a = market share of country j. 
* In some empirical studies, the effect of rival exchange rate is partially reflected by rival prices (usually 
domestic price). However, there exists simultaneous bias problem because it fails to capture the strategic 
interaction. 
^ 1 think the assumption of imperfect capital mobility is more realistic. 
(in-13a) 
(HI-13b) 
(HI-13c) 
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P = \- a = market share of country k, 
fij. = OBj + = trade weighted exchange rate, 
Pj = op J + = trade weighted price. 
Hence, if first-period demand is inelastic (elastic), pass-through is perverse (normal). 
Equation (111-13) shows the PTs in all three definitions, depending on the elasticity of good 
j's first period demand. When ej < 1,® market share is not seriously affected and firm j wants 
to enjoy current profits. Firm k just reacts to firm j's action as price on strategic 
complements. This is similar to proposition 2 of Tivig (1996), substituting another (rival) 
foreign firm instead of a domestic firm; that is, "With imperfect capital mobility, the 
elasticity of first-period import demand is a necessary and sufficient condition for PT 
direction of a temporary exchange rate change to first-period prices. Prices of the imported 
and of the domestically produced good always move in the same direction. The magnitude of 
change is greater for the imported good." However, if the rival exchange rate is also 
changed, the implication will be different. We now study the rival effect. 
[2] Temporary change of both and 
c/ej2 = cfe^2 =0(or Cov(e^,,e^,) = Cov(ej,,e^2) =0)-
Then, the comparative static will be: 
^ -1) (in-i4a) 
' Generally, duopolists produce their output in the elastic demand area. However, in the intertemporal 
optimization problem we can not eliminate the possibility of producing their output in the inelastic area, because 
current market shares affect future profits. 
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=;^ (n^., -1)^ + n* (I - £1-)), 
j\ "'^/l 
(ffl-14b) 
dPrx (ojitt -ysn* +(>gn^ -\^de^^ 
+Pde^^) (in-14c) 
First, let see the PT of exporter side (equation HI-14a and 14b). If —^ > 0 (or de.. 
Cov[e^, ] > 0) and e( ,s^ > 1(< 1), the exchange rate pass-through is more normal 
(perverse) than the case that we do not consider the change of rival's exchange rate. This 
also implies that pass-through of greater than unity is possible in some case. More interesting 
demand is no longer a necessary and sufficient condition for the "normal" PT of a temporary 
exchange rate change to first-period prices. For example, consider a case that increases 
by 10% and decreases by 20%. £{ > 1 does not guarantee the decrease of due to the 
second term of (ni-14a). While an increase of may induce the firm to decrease , the 
increase of p^^ motivated by the decrease of may result in an increase in . Also, 
prices of the firm j and k do not always move in the same direction. If the relative change of 
is large enough, firm j may have perverse pass-through while firm k has normal exchange 
rate pass-through.^ Even though the goods are strongly substitutable, we can observe, in 
some level, that firm j decreases the price while firm k increases the price of a good. Of 
course, this is related to an empirical issue. If the rival exchange rate is hold constant as in an 
< 0 (or de^^ < 0 and >0). The elasticity of first-period import 
' If duopoly (or oligopoly) firms produce in an elastic area (better match with the duopoly theory), Froot and 
Klemperer (1989) and Tivig (1996) can not explain the perverse exchange rate pass-through. 
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empirical test, perverse pass-through in terms of exporters is not possible in the elastic 
demand area. Again, it emphasizes that rival exchange rate should be considered in the pass-
through estimation. 
Next, equation (HI-14c) represents exchange rate PT faced by an importer. If a 
change of and a change of are in the same direction, the PT direction of a temporary 
exchange rate change to first-period prices only depends on £( and ; that is, if both and 
f ,* is greater (less) than unit, PT is normal (perverse), and if one of e[ s is less than unity and 
the other is greater than unit, the direction of PT is not obvious. However, it is clear that the 
possibility of perverse PT can not be eliminated even in the elastic demand area if a change 
of and a change of are in the opposite direction. Particularly, the perverse pass-
through may often happen if a small firm's demand is more elastic. 
[3] Permanent change of only. 
de de^, 
-— = 1 (or de ^ = de ^ = de ) and —— = —^ = 0. 
de,^ de^, de 
Then, the comparative static will be: 
If = -nU' , (in-.sa) 
(• - -.') - n;.* ^ 0^]}. (in-i5b) 
^ = -f -1) nt -nL) 
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^ Ptl^ ^y2 ® 
This is similar with Froot and Klemperer (1989) showing that exchange rate pass-
through will be more likely to be normal because the second period (negative'") effect is 
added to (HI-13). 
[4] Permanent change of both and 
dej2 de^^ 
—— = = 1 (or, dCji = dej2 = de^ and t/e^, = de^^_ = de^). 
«c^l ""ii 
Then, the comparative static will be: 
+  n ; . 1  dBj A '  d d 
, de, 
^ 4 ([nt?. (1 - n;.* 
-.) - n;A* . nix- j^l^> • (ni-i6b) 
3 O' 
Since < 0 and n, is second- period own currency profits of firm i, we derive that =— < 0. 
d p,\ d e,2 
Furthermore, generally. 
d p,xd e,2 d p,yd e , .  
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+KAI^, - «n;, )q,, {s^ -1) + A* {an], - ' 
O p,iC7 e,2 
+ A^(y0n;-anl)- ^]de,}. (in-16c) 
^ Pjl^ ^k2 
The effect of each exchange rate change is added by the second period terms 
compared to (111-14). Certainly, equation (HI-16a and 16b) imply that the importance of 
rival's exchange rate change is increased if own exchange rate change is temporary and the 
change of rival exchange rate is permanent. Interestingly, unlike Froot and Klemperer 
(1989), it is possible that a firm makes a perverse pass-through strategy even with a 
permanent exchange rate change if the change of rival's exchange rate is relatively large 
enough and in the opposite direction.'' Equation (III-16c) shows that, with the permanent 
changes of exchange rates and in the elastic demand areas, the possibility of perverse PT in 
terms of trade weighted can not be eliminated if a change of and a change of e, are in the 
opposite direction. 
III.4 Imperfect foresight and the exchange rate pass-through 
In Froot and Klemperer (1989), Tivig (1996), and section 2 of this chapter, it is 
assumed that the level of the exchange rate at successive instants of time are known (or 
perfectly forecasted). While theories need simplifying assumptions, this is unrealistic. 
'' Again, it is related with an empirical issue. Of course, if a rival exchange rate is hold as constant in the 
empirical test, perverse pass-through is not possible. 
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Therefore, in this section, I will assume that a firm's pricing decision is made after current 
exchange rates are known, but before future exchange rates are known, hi the two period 
model, the events are as follows: 
Pji^Pki ~^^j2^^k2 Pji'Pki ; when each firm chooses and respectively, 
they know and but do not know and 
The export firms' problems (III-6) will be modified as in (111-17): 
-y')qji(Pji,Pki)+^'[iej,p,j ^Pji^Ph)]}' (ni-17a) 
Max£[n*]= -r'ktiiPji^Pki) + -/'kkzi^'^Pa^Pki)]} • (in-17b) Pki-Pti 
The subgame of period two is solved first. In period two, the second-period dollar 
prices are chosen to maximize the own currency second-period profits : 
Maxn^ (in-18a) 
Pji  
Maxn* =ie;^2Pk2-r' ' )<Jk2(^' ' (Pji^Pki)^Pj2^Pk2) • (III-18b) Pki 
The first order conditions for the problem in (111-18) are: 
^ P/2 PJ2 
= +(^*2^2 = (in-19b) 
^  P k 2  ^  P k 2  
Some careful readers may think that the problem of order and payment lags does not justify this structure. 
Although this paper does not deal with hedging issues, the existence of currency futures market strongly 
supports this game structure. Indeed, whereas the short term futures market is easily available and practical, 
long term futures market is not available or very costly. 
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The second-period equilibrium prices are derived as functions of first-period prices, 
second-period exchange rates and second-period own currency marginal costs. The reduced 
form solutions are the following: 
Pp. =Pj2iPji^Pkiyej2,e„2^r',r'), (in-20a) 
p'k2 = y) • (in-20b) 
In the first period, firms maximize the present discounted value of own-currency 
profits by choosing first-period prices: 
Max£[n^]= E -r^)(l j i iPji^Pki)  
Pll "il-'n 
(m-21a) 
Max£[n*]= E  {(ejiPi, - r " ) q k i ( < P , \ ^ P k \ )  +  fti 
(in-21b) 
Using the envelope theorem we find the first-order necessary conditions for the problem in 
(in-21): 
d E[U^\ ^ ,Jq, ,  
^  P , X  ^  P j X  
^ qp d s' ^ q,-> d p I-, 
+ E -r^){ /'-)], (m-22a) 
^ S d P l\  Pkl  ^  P j\  
^ E [ W ]  a q , ,  
— T - — + ( e * , A , - r  ) : r ; r -
^  P k l  ^  P k X  
3* r r/ • t NX^ ^ki ^  ^  ^ qki ^ Pa rrrr ooM 
+ A. E \{e^2Pkl y  C* a r,  >9 n* /9 n (in-22b) 
«;2.'»2 O S O /7j, O Pi2 ^ Pk\ 
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Substituting (111-20) into (111-22), the reduced form solution of first-period prices are:'^ 
p'a = Pj\'^*1' ]' ]>f^<3r[e^2 ],Var[e^^],Cov[e^^,e^^ ],y^,/l', A*), (in-23a) 
P'ki  = PkiC^ji  ' ^[^y2] » ] . f ^ < 2 f [ e t 2 ] . C ' o v [ e ^ 2 Ir '  ) - (in-23b) 
hi the case of imperfect foresight, second-period exchange rates are not known, and 
each firm's first-period price decision relies upon the expected exchange rates, and variances 
and covariance of exchange rates. Due to brand loyalty, a current period pricing decision 
affects not only current profit but also future profit through its impact on a market share. At 
that time, the expected future profit (or the value of current market share) is effected by 
expected competition situations which depend on the interactive movement of future 
exchange rates. 
To obtain more precise results, I analyze exchange rate PT using an example of Tivig 
(1996) in which demand functions are linear and symmetric in current prices. This demand 
structure corresponds to the Hotelling model of differentiated products presented as the 
"Linear City Case" in Tirole (1990, chapter 7.1.1): 
1 ^,1 
Pi\ Pi\ ^ Q\ ~ ^j\ "^^kl = 1 — Q — Ri\ ' 
Ra -P,2 + Ps2 Qi =Rj2 +<ik2 = i ,s  = j ,k;  i^s ,  
where Q^ and ^^^t- and second-period market demand, respectively, normalized 
at one. Following the steps fi:om (HI-17) through (111-19), we obtain the solution of the 
second-period prices: 
" pj, and pIi depend on die distribution of • Assuming that it can be captured by the five 
parameters ( E[ej2 ], £[^*21' '^<=''"[^72 ]> ^^[^k2 ]> ^"^[^72 >^*21 )> we can get equation III-23. 
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1 
M 
•
 
1 
I "2 1 
.ph. 
1 
1 2 
Y S' + — 
. Y S" +-
^k2 
(in-20)' 
Then, following the steps from (111-21) to (111-22) we can get the solution of the first-
period prices: 
2 2 
Pji  
P'ki 
_1_ 
A 
2 - 9 A  I - 9 A  
3-25 2 2 
3-25 2 2 
g + g At Q2 ~ gPk ^ j2^j  
(in-23)' 
2 y' ffe 1 
where A = 3 - —(>9, + A), C„ s ——-: marginal cost in $, yfi; =A, ^, and 
9 cKJ e,I 
e ,2 E[e ,2 ] 
^/2 ^[^i2 ] 
Equation (111-23)' shows that the change of exchange rates affects each firm's pricing 
decision through (1) the change of dollar costs (C„), (2) the effect on real interest rates i/3,), 
and (3) the uncertainty effect (9, which depends on the distribution of exchange rate'"*). If 
costs adjust instantaneously, C„ is independent of exchange rates, and the cost effect due to 
the change of the exchange rate is zero. If costs adjust only to the anticipated change of 
exchange rate, C,, is changed by the unanticipated movement in e,^, while C,, is not 
affected; that is, a permanent shock where cost adjusts with a one period lag is comparable to 
a transitory shock. Equation (111-23)' also shows that prices decrease as uncertainties 
increase. In this study, the particular attention is paid to the uncertainty effect on exchange 
'•* See footnote 16 and 17. 
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rate pass-through. In the study of uncertainty effect, I distinguish between the cases of 
perfect and imperfect capital mobility. 
in.4.1 Perfect capital mobility 
With perfect capital mobility discount factors are related through the interest parity 
condition implying that P, is fixed. Then, we can derive Proposition 111-2 and Hl-3. 
Proposition III-2. With perfect capital mobility, for a temporary exchange rate shock, 
exchange rate PT increases as own and/or rival exchange rate uncertainties increase while 
exchange rate PT decreases as the covariance of exchange rates increases 
We can think that 6j is an approximation of own exchange rate uncertainty while 9^ 
is an approximation of rival exchange rate uncertainty.'^ In this "Linear City case", from 
equation (111-23)' we calculate the comparative static reactions to a temporary change in the 
exchange rate as follows: 
Proof. 
^P,i ^/i pj"' — ' 
— • < 0 because 
yi P j x  
dpji  2 B.  
< 0 .  T h e n ,  de de„ A 9 
d PT' d p,, d p^, d e,x ^ ... 
o o Tl—r<0' 1=J,K, dd, d e^,d 9,  d  d 9,  
•V 
0 
See footnote 16 and 17. 
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Exchange rate pass-through increases because uncertainty reduces the price level without the 
second-order effect. Meanwhile, because the covariance is negatively related to d, we can 
figure out the covariance effect on exchange rate pass-through as follows: 
^ p r  _  d p,, d d p,, ^ ^ 
d Cov d Cov Cov 
V 
0 - ^ 
Proposition I1I-3. With perfect capital mobility, for a permanent exchange rate shock (I) 
exchange rate PT increases as rival exchange rate uncertainty increases; (2) exchange rate 
PT decreases as own exchange rate uncertainty increases; and (3) exchange rate PT 
increases as the covariance of exchange rates increases. 
Proof 
In this "Linear City case", from equation (111-23)' we calculate the comparative static 
reactions to a permanent change in the exchange rate as follows: 
dp ^ e e 2 Ci 2 C j 2 2 C 
d PT^ d Pji Sj d d Pj^ e^ 
—rr;— = r"r r"! > 0. Here, the first positive term dominates the de,  d e^^ 9^ p, ,  de,  dO, p-.  
second negative term; or 
d PT' C.^ 2 2 2 3 - 2/3 2 
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" f A 5^* + QI +1A ^ 2)} > 0 • Meanwhile, 
d PT^ d Pj^ d p^, d p^, 
—:r^— = —r-r — < 0. Exchange rate pass-through increases 
3 6^ d e^d e,  3  ej £J^ p;, 
0 -
because uncertainty just reduces price without the second-order effect. Finally, from the fact 
that the covariance is negatively related to d, we can figure out the covariance effect on 
3 PT' ^ Pi\ e d p , d p , e 
exchange rate pass-through as follows: — = 7- < 0. d Cov d e^d Cov d e^ d Cov pj, 
•  V  '  > »  "  V 
— — -t-
Here, the first negative term dominates the second positive term. Q.E.D. 
IU.4.2 Imperfect capital mobility 
With imperfect capital mobility p, is not fixed. Assuming = A* = 1 to simplify, 
we can get the solution of first-period prices. Then, equation (111-23)' can be modified as 
equation (111-23)": 
Pjx 
P'ti A 
' 2 _  
9^*2 
2_ 
9^72 -^7. 
1 
~ 2 ^ ^ '  
2_ 
9^*2 ~^kl 
2_ 
9^72 -2eJ^ 
1 
~2'*' 
2 
(9^72 -2e„ 
2_ 
3(9 ^i2 
2 
-(9^72 
"T''' 3^72 
1 
3' 
. 2 
- i2  
-£*2. 
"^72 
(m-23)" 
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e,-, 
The E[—^] term depends on the distnbution of exchange rate uncertainties. For the 
further analysis, here I assume the random shoclcs of exchange rates follow a bivariate normal 
distribution.'^ Then, E{—\« £[e,, ]( ^ +^^^''3^) - by Taylor 
^t2 ^L^j2J ^L^t2J 
extension.'^ From (111-23)" we can see that the exchange rate PT will be affected by the 
'® For bivariate log-normal distribution, the analytic results of proposition III-4 and 5 are similar. If the random 
shoclcs of exchange rates follow a bivariate log-normal distribution, 
^[—]= ^ ( u s i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i f  (  X ,  y  )  =  ( l n e , , h i e j ~  
^j2 E[e ,2 ] '{E[e ,2 ]£[e,2 ] + Cov[e,2, ]) 
, (TZ,(J^) ,  E[ef  ef ] = sxp[afi^ + Pn +1 / 2(a " cr; + lafia + /?' cr;)]). For the proof of the 
D •  •  r r t  ,  I u ^ ^ ^ ^t®'2 '' ®i2 ] j ^ ] . j j Proposition III-4, only the = ^, and = =— terms are changed under 
^ yar[e,2 ] d Var\e,2 ] d Cov[e,2, 1 
bivariate log-normal distributions, resulting in the same results with the case of a bivariate normal distribution. 
However, the analysis for a permanent shock {Proposition fII-5) is more complicated because of the interactive 
relationship of variance and covariance in the E[e,2 / e,2 ] term. I could get the same results with Proposition 
111-5 at some particular points only; that is, marginal effects at the point that covariance is zero are the same with 
the case of a bivariate normal distribution. Otherwise, we can not determine the signs because of the interactive 
terms. 
First, assuming a normal distribution, by Taylor extension we can get: 
1) Cov[e, ,1 / e,, ] = E{(e, - E[e, ])(—- £[—])} = and 2) E[—] « .  
e, e, £[ej- e, £[ej E[e,Y 
Using I) and 2) we can get: £[-^] = E{e, ]£[-^] + Cov[e, ,^] a E[e, ]( ] 
E{eA E[e,y £[ej-
Proof of I): (e, - E[e,  ])(— -  £[-^]) « {e,  -  E[e,  ])(-^ -  £[—]) + {e,  -  E[e,  ])(  -  E[e,])  
e. e. E{eA e, E[e,Y 
+ i(e, - £[e, ])(-^)(e, _ E[e,  ])- Then, 
2 E[e,y 
E{{e,  -  £[e,])(—- £[—])} = £{(e, -  E[e,]){e,  -  £[e,])-} = because 
E[e,Y £[ej-
£{(e,  -  Eie,\){e,  -  E[e,])-} = £{£[(e,  -  £[e,])(e,  -  £[ej) ' lej}  = E{E[{e,  -  £[e,])|ej(e,  -  £[ej)-} 
= E{^{e, - £[eJXe, - £[ej)'} = E{^{e, - E[e,])^} = 0 
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covariance and variances of exchange rates as well as current own- and rival bilateral 
exchange rates and expected future exchange rates. To illustrate, I show how the covariance 
and variance of exchange rates affect the exchange rate PT. 
Proposition III-4. With imperfect capital mobility, for a temporary exchange rate shock, [A] 
If normal pass-through prevails (or > I), around a symmetric equilibrium, (1) exchange 
rate PT increases as the covariance of exchange rates increases: (2) exchange rate PT 
decreases as the variance of rival's exchange rate increases; and (3) exchange rate PT 
increases as the variance of own exchange rate increases. [BJ If perverse pass-through 
prevails (or f,' < I), around a symmetric equilibrium, (1) perverse exchange rate PT 
decreases as the covariance of exchange rates increases; (2) perverse exchange rate PT 
increases as the variance of rival's exchange rate increases; and (3) the direction of 
exchange rate PT is ambiguous as the variance of own exchange rate increases. 
Proof'^ 
In this "Linear City case", equation (111-22) is written as 
^5^" ^ (l-2p + ^ [(e,2Py*2-r')(-f)], (m-22a)' 
o P J ^  '2 J 
" In the proof of Proposition 111-2 and 3,1 just use the definition of PT^. However, the results are the same for 
n ^Pk\ jl ^Pkl ^T\ 
the definition of PT = • and PT' =( + ) because each firm's reaction is 
P k i  PT\ 
complementary and =0. 
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O L «y2.«»2 J (m-22b)' 
To calculate the comparative static reactions to a temporary change in the exchange 
rate, we differentiate (111-22)' and get: 
assuming = 0, 
dP.x 
^PkX 
\_ 
A 
2- 0 
g ^ j 2  ^ j i  
2 _  2 _  
(-^ + 2/7^1 -Pkx)dej ,  
0 
TU DT'y hen, PT' =——• = 2 
d^jx Pjx ^-Pjx 9 (q^*2 l)^y| 
-fzLo 3.- xzil±3^ ox In 
— ^ (2^4, 2) ^0 as f, ^1. 
PT' 
TF~r—T = "f Cov[e^2,et2] A 9 
2_ 2p;,-2/7^,-(1 + 2/7,,)-2p;, 
^ (2et, ^2*2) 
2_ -4pi,p;,-2/?;, 
(2p„)' < 0 around symmetry. 
Where = 
d p jX 
^ Cov[e„.e J-9  f e ) ' 9 " ' = ' ' ^  
' '*'~^Cov[e';,e.j"A.9'' '" 9 '  (?1 9"'='^ " 
For symmetric firms, « p^, and Then, 
^ pr 
^Cov[e^2,etJ A 
2P:. 
9 '^'(2pw) T<0. 
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d PV _ 2 _ ^ 2p;', • 2;?^, - (1 + 2/7^,) • 2p'j\ 
Where p" =—^_Ej1—__L/3.g _9g \3.y* —<o 
Oj, 1 2 _ 2 . ^,2 
^ I^arEe^J " A^9^" "^*1)9^ ^-^^3 < • 
PT' 
Thus, sign J = sign [/7^', -2^,, -p;',(l +2/7^,)] > 0 because \pt^\<\p';^\ and 
Ipj^ < (1 + 2p^,) around symmetry. 
d PT' e„ 2_ 2/7--2/7^,-(l + 2p„)-2/7;,' 
0^:;? •" 
^ P;i 12 2 e.. Where d",' = = —(—e , —e ,)~Y^ < 0? 
"*' = T^ ] = -2''"' 9• 
^ PT' 
Then, sign -777-7—r = sign [p'^[ •'^P,\~P'n^^ '^-Pk\)] • *^0^determine because 
0 Varyajj]  
d PT' > /?:'; <(1 + 2/ 7 . , )  |p;rl>|p;vl and 2p„ <(1 + 2a. ) .  77^-0 a s  '  
S PT However, if e{ >\, -———r<0. 
d Varie^j  ] 
If £( >\ o -]- + 2p^^ -p|^^>Q <=> /7^, >-^ around symmetry. 
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Then,sign-2/?^, -p;V(l + 2pi,)]=sign -2e^,)-{\ + 2p^^)<^e^^ -e^,)] 
2 _  
= sign [-2p^,e,, --e,2 +e„]<0. 
PT' However, if s{ < 1, . ^—- ? 0. Q.E.D. 
Var[ei^_] 
Proposition 111-5. With imperfect capital mobility, for a permanent exchange rate shock, (I) 
exchange rate PT increases as the covariance of exchange rates increases; (2) exchange rate 
PT increases as the variance of rival's exchange rate increases; and (3) exchange rate PT 
decreases as the variance of own exchange rate increases. 
Proof. 
For a permanent change of one exchange rate, a perverse exchange rate PT in this 
model is not possible.'' To calculate the comparative static reactions to a permanent change 
in the exchange rate, we differentiate (111-22)' and get: 
assuming de^ = 0 and de^, ^-de^^. 
'dPjx 1 
2_ 2 
~ A 2_ 
9 ^*2 ~^k\ 
2 
9^.2-2e 
" See Froot and Klemperer (1989). 
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^ 1 16 7 2 1 
2 , ^eij^orCe^j) 2Cov(e^j,e^2) 
ft ^ ^ ^2 Tr-» "*" :=-3 ^ ®y2 ^y2 
de. 
Then, PT' = dPn 
PA 
J 
A g^ti) 
J .  7  2 . 1  
/c + Q/'h - ft/ (;—+ 6 9 
-i2 -"A 
) 
Pa 
\6 
9 
/ _ 
+  ( ^ y . - 9 ^ 7 2 ) 9 / '  
e^, 3ei,P^ar(e^,) 2Cov{ej^,e^,  
- ^  + 
^72 -A 
P J X  
< 0 ,  
(1) ^ pr d Cov[e^^,e^j ,]  ^p]^ 
2_ 7 2_ 4 x' 
(2^*1 ~ 9 ^*2 ) 9 Pil " "9^/2)9 -3^ 
2 _  1 7  2 , 1  V a r i e , , )  
+  ( _ ^ +  - 3 ^ -  ) )  
2_ 2 ^ 3e,,Far(e^,) 2Cov(e^,,e,,) 
9^72)9?' ^g2^ "*• ^•» ^3 ) 
K. 
d Pn 2 2_ r' 2_ r' 
^ covK„..j 
p;i = 9'*''(?,!)' • 9 
For symmetric firms, ~ p^,, x' = T'* and e^, =e,, = e^, =6^2 initially. 
Then, the first [] term is negative. Next, we use the fact that (a) Var{e,^) < e,2 from the 
assumption that e, is a positive number and follow a normal distribution, and (b) non-
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negative profit condition. Then, second [] term is positive. Therefore, we can get 
d PT' 
d Cov[e^^,e,^\  <0. 
^ d PV \ 2 2 y' (2) ^17-7—T =Tir (2e., dVar[e^2] Ap- 9e k2 
1 25 2_ _ 
2_ 1 16 7 2 , 1 FarCe^z) (2e. ,  -ge, ,X~-jp„ *-p„ --r  (^  + -^))  
2_ 2 e,, 3e4,Far(e^,) 2Cov(e^, ,£,,) 
+ K. -Q^y2)Qr '(7r + 
^72 
) yl 
/'vi 1 2_ 2 i e.2 
=77^=1(9^"-^'"'9'' 5:17 
Ptl 1 2 _ 2 , Sy2 
With the fact that initially e^, = e,, = = ^t2' the first [] term is zero. Next, second [] term 
d PT' 
is negative because —— < 0. Then, we can get -———- < 0. 
de a Var[ei^2 J 
(3) d PT' dVar[e^,] ^p]^ 
i- -
9^*2.9 
2 2 . 3e kl (2eH-W^,2)nPli" + ( ^ y i  - 9  ^ 7 2 ) 9 / '  - = 7  
2  1 7  2 , 1  F a r ( e „ )  
2_ 2 e„ 3e„Fcfr(e 0 2Cov(e, ,e,,) 
—  < »  - " 4  — v ' r — +  ;  —  :  
y l  
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where p'j" = ^ PjX 
a Var[e^,] 
d PT' Smularly with (I), we can get —— > 0. Q.E.D. 
These main results are due to brand loyalty and imperfect foresight for exchange 
rates. The decision of current price influences future profit through market shares as well as 
a current profit. The effects of exchange rate uncertainty on pass-through depend on the 
curvature of future profitability on future exchange rates. For example, for a temporary 
shock, the second period profit is a convex function of own exchange rate. With the 
switching costs, each firm may act as a monopolist in its first-period share of the market, and 
a monopolist's profit is a convex function of its cost. Therefore, greater uncertainty of own 
exchange rate increases the value of market shares, hence lowers a current price to increase 
the market share. Likewise, for a temporary shock, the second period profit is a concave 
function of a rival exchange rate and PT decreases as rival's exchange rate uncertainty 
increases. A risk neutral profit maximizer increases the PT and attacks the market when 
covariance between own- and rival exchange rate is high. Intuitively, the firm will not 
hesitate to change its price because a higher covariance guarantee a more stable or insured 
competition condition in the future market. For example, ceteris paribus, if a Korean firm 
competes against a Japanese rather than a German firm, the pass-through is higher assuming 
that the won/dollar rate is more closely correlated to the yen/dollar rate. 
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III.5 Conclusions 
If otlier foreign firms exist in an imperfect competition market, the foreign firm's 
pricing behavior is affected by rival countries' exchange rates through strategic interactions. 
In this chapter, I explicitly analyzed the effect of rival exchange rate both in the case of 
perfect foresight and in the case of imperfect foresight. Although the assumption of perfect 
foresight is not realistic, it makes the analysis easier and tractable. In section 2, my results 
add to those of Froot and Klemperer's (1989). First, pass-through of greater than unity is 
possible in some cases (especially, in the definition of exporter PT). It is shown that if the 
change of own exchange rate is in the same direction with rival's, the normal exchange rate 
pass-through is magnified by the rival, and the PT can be greater than one. Indeed, some 
empirical studies have shown that the PTs are over 100 % for some industries.^" Second, if 
the change of own exchange rate is in the opposite direction to that of the rival's and is 
relatively small compared to the rival's, perverse exchange rate pass-through happens even 
with elastic demands. Also, it is possible that the firm chooses a perverse pass-through 
strategy even with a permanent exchange rate change. Third, the possibility of perverse PT in 
terms of a trade weighted exchange rate can not be eliminated either for permanent or for 
temporary shocks, even in the elastic demand area, if the change of and the change of 
are in opposite directions. If duopoly (or oligopoly) firms produce in the elastic area (which 
is a better match with the duopoly theory), Froot and Klemperer (1989) and Tivig (1996) can 
not explain the perverse exchange rate pass-through. 
See Marquez (1991), Feenstra (1989) and Phillips (1988). 
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In the case of the imperfect foresight, the exchange rate PT is affected by the 
covariance and variances of exchange rates as well as current exchange rates and expected 
future exchange rates. Due to brand loyalty, current price decisions will affect future profits 
through market shares. The expected future profit is effected by expected competition 
situations which depend on the interactive movement of future exchange rates. Proposition 
III-2 and IU-3 summarize the uncertainty effect on exchange rate PT in the case of perfect 
capital mobility while Proposition III-4 and III-5 summarize how the interactive movement 
of exchange rates affects the exchange rate PT in the case of imperfect capital mobility. 
Most importantly, this research emphasizes the importance of market structure in 
exchange rate pass-through studies. The specification of market structure changes the 
analytical form and also raises questions concerning the definition of PT. Most existing 
theoretical and empirical studies on exchange rate PT do not pay an attention to the 
competition between goods that produced in different source countries. 
Much additional research needs to be done in this area. In particular, the extension to 
an n-period dynamic game would be useful, and a general equilibrium approach and cost 
structure with the consideration for stochastic functional form of exchange rate would be 
more in keeping with the environment in which real world firms must make decisions. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH: 
THE EFFECT OF RIVALS' EXCHANGE RATES 
IV. 1 Introduction 
Exporting firms based in different countries have faced notably large fluctuations in 
currency values, particularly since the advent of floating exchange rates. In an export market, 
the major uncertainty may result from the change of exchange rate. Exchange rate changes 
are usually perceived as cost shocks for a foreign firm producing in its home country and 
selling in its export market. When the exchange rate changes, the firm may choose to pass 
the cost shock into its selling prices; it is called exchange rate pass-through. 
During the last two decades, there have been over 50 published empirical studies on 
exchange rate pass-through (PT). Over half of the studies employed an aggregate approach. 
However, the aggregate approach raises the concern of possible aggregation bias in the pass-
through estimates, especially given the fact that studies such as Feenstra (1989), Feinberg 
(1989), Kasa (1992) and Athukorala and Mennon (1994) found significant differences in 
pass-through rates across industries, possibly reflecting differences in demand and cost 
conditions. Thus exchange rate-price relationships cannot be meaningfiilly studied without 
referring to disaggregated data. Furthermore, Citrin (1989) and Lawrence (1990) argued that 
much of the "pass-through puzzle" lies in the data and not in actual behavior. They 
suggested that previous findings of incomplete pass-through for US imports have resulted 
from the inclusion of computer and other business machines imports, whose prices have 
fallen quite dramatically during the 1980s. 
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Studies using disaggregated data in sectors or industries, which is still a very high 
level of aggregation, also often face a proxy bias. Previous studies have frequently relied on 
price proxies such as import or export unit values. For example, in a sectoral analysis, 
bilateral disaggregated import data for the United States are reported only in current dollars 
and appropriate price deflators are not available. Alterman (1991) emphasized the bias 
introduced into estimates of pass-through as a result of measurement errors inherent in price 
proxies. 
Existing empirical research has documented several stylized facts about pass-through. 
While Kreinin (1977), Spitaeller (1980), Khosla and Teranishi (1989), and Knetter (1989) 
found that PT behavior differs across source countries, Feenstra (1989), Feinberg (1989), 
Kasa (1992), and BCnetter (1993) found significant differences in PT rates across industries or 
product categories. Especially, Knetter (1993) found strong evidence of differences in PT 
behavior across industries and relatively little evidence of differences across source countries 
within the same industry. However, there is little disaggregated research attempting to 
formally explain inter-industry differences in PT. 
Incomplete pass-through is a common and pervasive phenomenon across a wide range 
of countries. Much of the literature explains the incomplete PT with an imperfect 
competition model. Although there are many empirical studies estimating imperfect 
competition model, those were tested with aggregate data. This mismatch should be of 
concern if the industry and aggregate data behave differently. 
This line of research has paid little attention to the differences of competition 
situation across destination countries and commodities. There is no literature giving attention 
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to strategic interactions with other foreign rivals (e.g., how the existence of other foreign 
rivals and the movement of rival countries' exchange rates affect pass-through). The existing 
exchange rate pass-through (PT) literature is based on an imperfect competition model of a 
foreign firm and a domestic firm, including only one bilateral exchange rate. However, if 
other foreign firms exist in the market, the foreign firm's pricing behavior will be affected by 
rival countries' exchange rates through the strategic interaction. Intuitively, a firm with small 
market share may choose its price depending on rival's price rather than its own exchange 
rate. In an export market, an exporter may often face other foreign firms rather than domestic 
firms as major rivals. Indeed, in some markets, a domestic firm does not exist. Even when 
domestic firms exist, the substitutability between imported goods is often much higher than 
the one between an imported good and a domestic good. Thus, rival exchange rates may 
have a significant effect on the firm's price decision through the strategic interaction. The 
importance of strategic interaction in an export market was recognized by Goldberg and 
BCnetter (1997, p. 1265) as follows. 
International economists typically impose the Armington assumption - i.e., they 
assume that products within an industry are differentiated according to the country of 
production. An extreme interpretation of the Armington assumption implies that 
goods produced in different countries represent different markets. ... The 
competition firom these other sources is accounted for by including the prices of 
substitutes in the set of demand shifters or rotators; but this treatment fails to capture 
the strategic interaction. 
This research is different fi:om earlier empirical studies in several regards. First, this 
study employs the disaggregated data at the finest level. The 7-digit level TSUSA (Tariff 
Schedule of the United States Annotated) data that I use here contains over 16,000 product 
categories while the 7-digit level SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) contains 
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about 3000 categories. The result of the tests, for the market of specific commodities, will be 
freer from the aggregation bias mentioned above and better matched with an imperfect 
competition model. Furthermore, the disaggregated data should also enable more accurate 
estimation of the time-lags involved in the transmission of exchange rate changes to prices 
(Hopper & Mann, 1989). The use of such micro-level data may shift the emphasis of the 
study to the level of the firm and make the study useful to intemational marketers as they 
determine their pricing strategies. However, this study will also generate some implications 
at the macro-level that will be further explained in the results section. Specifically, in export 
price pass-through studies, an export price is affected not only by own trade weighted 
exchange rate but also by rivals' exchange rates in each destination market. 
Second, this research emphasizes the role of strategic behavior between foreign firms 
in a market, by expanding the data sample to include two or three major exporting countries 
that compete in a common export (U.S.) market in the same industries. The competition 
structure differs across destination markets as well as across industries or goods. The 
different exchange rate PT may result from the differences in the degree and structure of 
competition across destination markets as well as the differences in destination-specific 
demand for a good. Furthermore, the existence of foreign rivals and the movement of rival 
countries' exchange rates may be an explanation for inter-industry differences in PT. The 
particular attention of this empirical study is focused on the effect of rival exchange rates. 
Actually, in a price decision, the rival's exchange rate may have as much affect on the firm's 
decision as its own exchange rate. For example, a Korean exporter of electronic goods will 
be sensitive to the value of Japanese currency. In this chapter, I will study the effect of rival's 
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exchange rate using data of specific commodities. Because of data limitations, I postpone the 
comparison across destination markets, testing only the U.S. import markets. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The imperfect competition model is presented in 
section 2. In section 3,1 derive the econometric model, whereas section 4 reviews the data 
used. In section 5,1 present and discuss the empirical results, and concluding remarks are 
provided in section 6. 
IV.2 The imperfect competition model 
I consider a heterogeneous oligopoly whose firms use price strategies. There are n 
firms based in different source countries.' Therefore, each firm faces a different exchange 
rate. Each firm i exports the differentiated good i to a destination market (say U.S.), 
respectively. The foreign spot prices of the destination currency are denoted by e, (foreign 
country i's currency/$). The destination currency prices of the imported varieties of a 
differentiated product are denoted by p,. I will treat a rival prices' vector as P_,. Then, I 
can write import demand as q, (p, ,P_, ,Z), where Z denotes a vector of all variables shifting 
demand. The foreign firms maximize profits in its own currency, treating P_, as exogenous." 
I assimie that its pricing decision is made after the exchange rate is known with certainty. If, 
however, its pricing decision must be made before the exchange rate is known, the rational 
' Here, I exclude the US domestic firms in this competition because domestic data that match 7-digit TSUSA 
commodity categories are not available. I implicitly assume that the substitutability among imported goods is 
much higher than the one between an imported good and a domestic good. Indeed, in the international export 
market, an exporter may face other foreign firms rather than domestic firms as major rivals. Patriotism may also 
help the model justification. 
' Thus, I assume that the foreign firms act as Bertand competitor. However, my generalized empirical model 
which can match conjectural variation behavior is independent of this assumption. 
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expectation on expected exchange rate can justify the model. As discussed by Baron (1976), 
McKinnon (1979), and Giovannini (1988), the foreign firms then face a decision as to which 
currency to use in announcing its price. I will not analyze this problem, but rely on the fact 
that 85 percent of U.S. imports are invoiced in dollars.^ Since my empirical work deals with 
this market, I simply assume that the foreign firms set their price in the destination market 
currency ($). 1 also assume that the cost flmctions in the foreign currency are separable in 
quantity and input prices so that it can be written as (p, {q, )<(>, (W,) and marginal cost is 
(p'Xq, )^i (W,), where q, is the output of good i, and W, is a vector of firm i's input factor 
prices. The foreign firms' profit maximization problems can be written as: 
Max[e. A?, (/>, ,P-, .Z) - «(?,)«», (W,)] (IV-1) 
P, 
where / = 1,2,...«. The first-order condition for (IV-1) is: 
^;(9,M(W,) = e,p,(l--) (IV-2) 
n, 
^ q p 
where 7, = —•—- denotes the (positive) elasticity of demand for firm i. Rearranging 
equation (IV-2) yields a markup model of price determination which prevails in previous 
empirical studies in this field (e.g., Athukorala, 1991; Athukorala and Menon, 1994; Hooper 
and Marm, 1989). 
p, = mk, mc, / e, (fV-S) 
where mk, = (1 - —)"'. The typical exporting firm sets an export price (p,) in importer 
V, 
currency ($) at a markup (mk,) over its marginal cost of production (mc, / e,). If perfect 
^ See Hamada and Horiuchi (1987). 
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competition prevails (7, = °o), then a price is equal to a marginal cost, and pass-through is 
perfect. 
d q dr I 
Assuming that {q,) ——-S, (W,) - e, ——] *• 0, where r, = p, (1 - —), we can 
^ A o p ,  r j ,  
convert (rV-2) to obtain the pricing equation: 
A=;r,(e,,<!),(W,),P.„Z). (IV-4) 
rv.3 The econometric model 
Differently fi-om other oligopoly empirical studies in exchange rate pass-through, I 
estimate a system of equations to see the effect of rival exchange rate. Since most studies 
approximate the competitor prices as a domestic price or a trade weighted price, and regard 
the competitor prices as an independent variable, only a single equation estimation method 
could be used. However, these estimations hide the effect of rival's exchange rate fluctuation 
and are both biased (i.e., the effect of own exchange rate is overstated) and inconsistent as 
well known. 
To test the effect of rival's exchange rate change, I use a log-linear specification for 
(IV-4) which is a variant of Feenstra's (1989) model.'' 
n 
In A, = a,o + Inx" + a,2 + or,3 hi^, (W„) + X A ^Pj. + (IV-5) 
where e„ is a random error and i, j = l,2,...n. The vector of variables shifting demand (Z) is 
represented by the economic activity of destination country {y"). The demand function 
•* Feenstra(1989) estimated just a single equation with instrumental variables because he did not consider 
strategic behaviors between exporters. 
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corresponding to the specification (IV-5) can be obtained by assuming constant pass-through 
and solving the resulting differential equation/ 
To estimate (IV-5) we must specify how the cost function in input price is 
determined. I assume that each firm uses two inputs, labor and capital. Firms are assumed to 
minimize the unit cost of production by choosing the best combination of labor and capital. 
The cost fimction in input price ((W„)) is given by a Cobb-Douglas cost function. The 
time trend is used to capture the effects of productivity change: 
ln<!>,(W„) = hia,o hiwg„ him,, + f j  + fnj'+^i  • Where and in,, are 
prices of labor and capital at time t for each firm i, and /„ = f,Q+ f,yt + is a time trend. 
Then our estimating simultaneous equations are derived as: 
n 
= c,o +C„/ + c,2r +a„ \nyT +a,, lne„ + XA In/>7„ +s„ 
y=i.y»' 
(IV-6) 
where i,J = 1,2 • • • n; c,o = a,o + a,3 (hia,o + /o)' = or,3/,, c,, = or,3/,, and = a,3a„. 
^ See Feenstra (1989) for detail. Totally differentiating (IV-2), we obtain 
{dp ,  /  de ,  ) (e ,  /  p , )  =  - l /  [(?>/ (? ,  /  r ,  I  d  p ,  ) {p ,  I  r , ) ] .  For example, to obtain a pass-through elasticity 
of-Vi set 97,"= 0 and {d  r , !d  p ,X/?, /r,) = I + {p]  /r , j ] } %  I d  p , )  =  2 .  Then the solution is obtained as 
q,  =  {k ,  /  p , ) -q° ,  where q°  >  0 and k,  >0  can depend on P_, and y*" . By choosing k,  =  (P_,)" , 
and solving for the optimal price, we obtain a log-linear specification as (IV-5). The demand curves leading to a 
constant pass-through unequal to -'/i are more complex. 
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We have n equations with a n firms' oligopoly market and estimate n simultaneous 
equations as a system (3SLS).^ The equations in the system are identified/ The interest of 
estimation is the pattern of the coefficients or,,, which indicate the rate at which exchange 
rate changes are passed through to import prices. The responsiveness of export price in $ 
(/7,) to change in own bilateral exchange rate (e,) and the effect of rivals' exchange rates 
changes on export price in $(/?,) are calculated from: 
'h ip , '  
hip. 
1 
-A.  
-A2 • 
1 
•  -A/  
• ~ A/I 
-I 
a,2 hie„ 
«22 ^^2/ 
,^Pn. 
• 
1 
•
 
I " 1 
a 1 For example, for n = 2, while '' measures the responsiveness of export price in $ (/?,) 
^ Pij PII 
to change in own bilateral exchange rate (e,), -—scales the effect of rival exchange 
PijPj< 
rates changes ( e ^ )  o n  export price in $ (p,). 
Alternative specifications: 
I may also estimate the reduced form of (rV-6). To see only the effect of rival's 
exchange rate change, the structural form estimation is not required. The reduced form for 
each firm i will be: 
® Although full information maximum likelihood (FIML) is theoretically favorable, since three stage least 
squares (3SLS) does not require a normality assumption, it is a frequently used method for relatively small 
samples as in our data. 
' Kelejian and Oates (1989) demonstrate that the necessary condition for identification in a simultaneous 
equations system in which endogenous variables enter nonlinearly is /!,, ^ /l,,. Where = number of 
predetermined variables appearing in the model but not appearing in the /th equation and Aj, = number of 
endogenous variables appearing as a regessor in the rth equation. In this system, = 3(n-I) and Aj, = n-1 
In A = ^0, + + Z ^2j + X ^3y +X^4j lne„ + //, (IV-7) 
7=1 7=1 7=1 
where Vg, = Vqo + vbi^ + ^02'' • While k,, measures the effect of export price in $(/?,) to 
change in own bilateral exchange rate (e,), scales the effect of rival j's exchange rate 
(e^) change on export price in $ (/?,). 
VI.4 Data description 
I estimate the US import markets for specific industries or goods. The use of highly 
disaggregated data is motivated by the fact that individual commodities differ with regard to 
demand, cost conditions and competition situations, and estimates at the aggregate level tend 
to mask such differences. For specific commodities, the U.S. import data and ) 
are obtained by commodity by country of origin on annual base from the U.S. Department of 
commerce. Bureau of the Census. The TSUSA data at the 7-digit level in the present study 
are compiled at the finest level of aggregation available in publicly distributed trade statistics. 
However, publicly distributed annual data may not be desirable for this research because of 
low frequency. 
Fortunately, 1 could get the unpublished TSUSA monthly data at the 7-digit level 
from Dr. William R. Smith (the author of Exchange Rates and Prices: The Case of United 
States Imports). He kindly provided 112 product data covering from January of 1978 through 
December of 1988. Although the TSUSA contains over 16000 product categories. Smith 
Q (1996) chose 112 products through several sample selection criteria: (1) chose products 
* See Smith (1996, p. 66-75) for detail. 
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whose total import values are during 1988 at least $75 million, (2) removed products whose 
total import value are zero in 1978, (3) removed heterogeneous product categories, (4) 
removed products whose quantities are expressed in different quantity measures at different 
times or by different importers, (5) excluded by initial examination for price heterogeneity, 
etc. The time period was chosen for some reasons including (1) exchange rates of most 
major US trading partaers were floating, (2) many important traded products, such as certain 
types of electronics, were not produced in earlier time period, (3) since 1990, the 7-digit 
categories were changed to 10 digit. 
The distinguishing feature of this data is that the import prices are genuine prices 
which are free from well-known limitations as price proxies. However, we have to regard all 
foreign firms that are based in the same country as a representative firm (or firms of the same 
country are identical) because of data limitations. Since these firms are affected by the same 
bilateral exchange rate, it seems not to affect our test too seriously. In choosing commodity 
markets, I added some additional rules to Smith (1996)'s. First, I choose goods imported 
from only a few countries, to avoid monopoly or perfect competition markets. Next, I 
transform the monthly data into quarterly data to reduce some data problems (order-delivery 
lag, etc.). I also remove goods which have any zero value through the whole sample period 
(i.e., quarter one of 1978 through quarter four of 1988). Finally, I remove products whose 
major exporters are Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand. For these countries, wage and/or interest rate data are not available for the whole 
sample period.' After implementing these criteria, I am left with 20 product markets to test. 
' Smith (1996)'s study included these countries because his model does not employ any other variable except 
exchange rates and prices. 
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The twenty products and their classification codes are: beer (1670515), wail paper (2560500), 
benzene (4011000), sodium hydroxide (4210800), polybutadiene rubber (4461516), 
electrodes, partially carbon or graphite (5176100), steel pipe, unalloyed, welded, not casing 
(6103955), steel wire stand, brass plated (6421110), piston-type diesel engine, excluding auto 
and mfg. (6604260), motor vehicle pimips, liquid (6609720), wheel-type front-end loaders 
(6640720), chainsaws (6747025), shavers with self-contained electric motor (6835020), spark 
plug (6836060), relays with contacts under 10 amps (6859034), insulated power cable, less 
than 601 volt capacity (6880465), wheel-type agri tractors, 40 to 80 hp (6923406), eyeglasses 
with frames (7084720), silver halide paper for color picture negatives (7233030), and grand 
pianos (7250320). Other data sources are as follows, and all data are available on quarterly 
basis. 
p, = dollar price (importer currency) of exports from country / to the U.S. 
y" = economic activity of U.S. As a proxy real GNP is available as quarterly base 
(source: Main Economic Indicators, OECD). 
e, = exchange rate of country i; exporter i currency/ $ (source: International 
Financial Statistics, IMF). 
wg, = average wage of country i (source: Intemational Financial Statistics, IMF). 
/«, = interest rate of country i. Due to availability for a whole sample period, different 
interest rates across countries are used (treasury bill rates for Canada, Mexico 
and U.K.; discount rates for Korea; money market rates for other countries), 
(source: Intemational Financial Statistics, IMF). 
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IV.5 Estimation results and discussion 
Twenty U.S. import industry models are estimated with quarterly data. It seems that 
the estimation of 3SLS does not have any advantage compared to the reduced form 
estimation in viewing the effect of exchange rates because economic theory tells us that 
reduced form parameters are the long-run multipliers associated with the model. However, in 
the over-identified case, the pass-through estimates from 3SLS are biased, but consistent and 
more efficient than those from the reduced form (Kennedy; 1992, p. 168); 
If the structural equations are over-identified, more efficient estimates of the reduced-
form parameters can be obtained by taking structural parameter estimates (that 
incorporate the over-identifying restrictions) and using them to estimate directly the 
reduced-form parameters. Although these "derived" reduced form estimates are 
biased (whereas the OLS reduced form estimates are not), they are consistent, and 
because they incorporate the over-identifying information, are asymptotically more 
efficient than the OLS reduced form estimates. Monte Carlo studies have shown the 
derived reduced form estimates to have desirable small sample properties. Of course, 
if the over-identifying restrictions are untrue, the OLS reduced form estimates will 
superior; a suggested means of testing over-identifying restrictions is through 
comparison of predictions using OLS reduced-form estimates and derived reduced-
form estimates.'" 
We can think, in the over-identified case, 3SLS estimates are restricted by structural 
parameters while reduced estimations are an unrestricted regression. Furthermore, we, from 
3SLS, can see the coefficients for structural forms and figure out the economical meanings." 
To increase the degree of freedom, T~ or interest rate terms which are not employed by most 
researchers were removed if the coefficients were not statistically significant. The reason 
Following the suggested means, I tested the over-identifying restrictions. Derived reduced form estimates are 
superior to OLS reduced form estimates in 11 markets (wall paper, benzene, electrodes, steel pipe, steel wire 
stand, fi-ont-end loaders, chainsaws, relays, eyeglasses, silver halide paper, and grand pianos). 
" Other coefficients than PT are not reported here because there are too many coefficients from 45*2 equations. 
Although many coefficients are not significant statistically, resulting in relatively weak support, there is little 
that is adverse to economic sense. 
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why interest rates are not employed by other literature is that, in the short run, capital is fixed. 
Results for the twenty U.S. import products are reported in Table IV-1. For each product the 
table reports the pass-through of own exchange rate and rivals' exchange rates from both 
3SLS estimates and reduced form estimates. The countries included in the model are the 
major exporters. Also, average market shares during whole sample period are reported. For 
example, in the polybutadiene rubber market, 3SLS (reduced form) estimation tell us that a 
Canadian exporter passes 76.6% (77.0%) of own exchange rate fluctuation to its export price 
in U.S. dollar while a Japanese exporter passes 65.6% (54.4%) of the fluctuation of Canadian 
exchange rate. Other PTs are not statistically significant. The average market shares in the 
polybutadiene rubber import market of U.S. are 46% for Canada and 25% for Japan. 
Both estimations show significant normal pass-through'^ for rival exchange rate as 
well as own exchange rate in most product markets. With 3SLS estimation, we can see that 
23 exporters from 17 commodity markets show significant normal pass-through for own 
exchange rate while 11 exporters firom 10 commodity markets show significant normal pass-
through for rivals' exchange rates. It supports the conventional wisdom that exporters 
capable of price adjustment pass cost shocks induced by exchange rate fluctuations to their 
export prices. The reduced form estimation also indicates that 17 exporters from 16 
commodity markets show significant normal pass-through for own exchange rate while 13 
exporters from 12 commodity markets show significant normal pass-through for rival 
exchange rates. Only three exporters have perverse pass-through behavior for own or rival 
In our model, normal pass-through will be negative pass-through for both own and rival exchange rates. 
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Table IV-1. Exchange rate pass-through 
Product 
(TSUS/«f) 
Source 
country 
Import 
Market 
Share 
3SLS Reduced form 
Own RivaH Rival2 
exchange exchange exchange 
rate rate rate 
Own RtvaH Rival2 
exchange exchange exchang 
rate rate e rate 
Beer Canada 22% -0.427* -0.168 0.154 -0.280 -0.791** 0.776** 
1670515 (0.249) (0.157) (0.150) (0.251) (0.368) (0.367) 
Germany 15% -0.155 -0.207 0.012 -0.168 -0.023 0.039 
(0.129) (0.158) (0.124) (0.191) (0.130) (0.190) 
Netherlands 44% -0.691*** -0.256 -0.067 -0.728** -0.550** -0.058 
(0.101) (0.168) (0.102) (0.316) (0.216) (0.317) 
Wall paper Canada 38% -1.203*** 0.324 -0.078 -0.984** 0.206 -0.063 
2560500 (0.436) (0.277) (0.064) (0.482) (0.312) (0.118) 
Korea 12% -0.055 -0.932** 0.100 -0.472 -0.294 0.179 
(0.175) (0.396) (0.084) (0.541) (0.835) (0.205) 
UK 18% 0.053 -1.546** 0.319 0.325 -0.175 -0.408 
(0.063) (0.646) (0.357) (0.194) (0.788) (0.511) 
Benzene Canada 30% -1.682** 0.664 -1.775** 0.482 
4011000 (0.804) (0.877) (1.020) (1.037) 
Japan 15% 0.767 -2.204** 0.785 -2.200** 
(0.923) (1.097) (0.448) (0.984) 
Hydroxide Canada 53% -2.876*** 0.362 -2.980*** 0.644*** 
4210800 (0.498) (0.429) (0.489) (0.216) 
Germany 13% -1.508** -4.969*** 0.400 -4.409*** 
(0.740) (1.174) (0.625) (1.417) 
Polybutadiene Canada 46% -0.766*** 0.042 -0.770** -0.015 
rubber (0.203) (0.066) (0.302) (0.135) 
4461516 Japan 25% 0.130 -0.656*** -0.001 -0.545* 
(0.097) (0.169) (0.129) (0.287) 
Electrodes Canada 5% -5.786 1.418 2.011 1.449 
5176100 (13.093) (1.213) (3.322) (1.158) 
Japan 66% -0.481*** 0.708 -0.481** 0.581 
(0.161) (2.302) (0.180) (0.516) 
Steel pipe Canada 51% -1.873*** 0.053 -1.936*** 0.071 
6103955 (0.336) (0.212) (0.195) (0.087) 
Japan 40% -0.335** -1.320*** -0.120 -0.868*** 
(0.167) (0.266) (0.096) (0.214) 
' Standard errors that are calculated by a delta method are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
based on asymptotic t-ratios: *** at the 1 percent level, at the 5 percent level, • at the 10 percent level. 
" Rival 1 and rival 2 are ordered alphabetically. For example, in the beer market, the rival I of Germany is 
Canada, and the rival 2 of Germany is Netherlands. 
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Product Source Import 
(TSUSMf) country Market 
Share 
Table IV-1 Coatinued 
3SLS 
Own RrvaH Rival2 
exchange exchange exchange 
rate rate rate 
Reduced form 
Own RivaH Rtval2 
exchange exchange exchang 
rate rate e rate 
Steel wire Italy 10% 0.071 0.017 0.224 -0.126 
stand (0.100) (0.070) (0.193) (0.200) 
6421110 Japan 41% -0.013 0.061 0.131 -0.111 
(0.050) (0.089) (0.230) (0.222) 
Diesel engine Germany 18% -1.051 -0.053 -0.344 -0.667 -0.784* -0.646 
6604260 (0.685) (0.470) (0.804) (0.456) (0.475) (0.516) 
Japan 25% -0.766 0.786 -0.086 0.325 0.606 0.862 
(1.122) (1-125) (0.370) (0.650) (0.624) (0.706) 
UK 37% -0.491 -0.401 -0.549 0.480 0.455 -0.837 
(1.067) (1.012) (1.209) (1.069) (0.945) (0.985) 
Motor vehicle Germany 23% 0.558 -1.593* 0.660 -1.726** 
pumps (0.683) (0.906) (0.644) (0.806) 
6609702 Japan 43% -1.412** 0.306 -1.628*** 0.528 
(0.594) (0.438) (0.572) (0.457) 
Front-end Canada 37% -1.850*** 0.050 -2.217*** 0.164 
loaders (0.480) (0.090) (0.628) (0.318) 
6640720 Japan 29% 0.157 -1.306** 0.486 -1.511* 
(0.258) (0.619) (0.457) (0.903) 
Chainsaws Germany 31% -0.766*** -0.002 0.045 -0.196 -0.028 -0.529 
6747025 (0.183) (0.058) (0.142) (0.274) (0.218) (0.371) 
Japan 17% 0.422 -0.706 -0.229 0.352 -0.061 -0.398 
(0.327) (0.460) (0.333) (0.447) (0.562) (0.759) 
Sweden 31% 0.295 -0.716** 0.063 0.768 -0.920** 0.047 
(0.260) (0.289) (0.099) (0.464) (0.344) (0.273) 
Shavers Japan 11% -0.628* 0.156 0.688 -0.337 
6835020 (0.345) (0.243) (0.492) (0.348) 
Netherlands 73% -0.599*** 0.402 -0.468* 0.210 
(0.197) (0.332) (0.242) (0.341) 
Spark plug Germany 37% -0.426*** 0.112 -0.644*** 0.068 
6836060 (0.136) (0.215) (0.151) (0.200) 
Japan 52% -0.443** 0.129 -0.390 0.085 
(0.170) (0.091) (0.278) (0.209) 
Relays Japan 29% 0.556 -0.271** 0.273 -0.217** 
6859034 (0.482) (0.127) (0.208) (0.089) 
Mexico 33% -0.061 -0.420 -0.099 -0.070 
(0.099) (0.268) (0.071) (0.166) 
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Table IV-1 Continued 
3SLS Reduced form 
Product Source Import Own Rivall Rtval2 Own Rivall Rival2 
CTSUS/«f) country Market exchange exchange exchange exchange exchange exchang 
Share rate rate rate rate rate e rate 
Power cable Canada 50% -1.659*** -0.193*** -1.864*** -0.192*** 
6880465 (0.336) (0.051) (0.384) (0.049) 
Mexico 12% -1.001*** 0.671 -0.936*** 0.481 
(0.196) (1.235) (0.204) (1.610) 
Ag. Tractors Germany 35% -0.523** 0.473 -0.703*** -0.270 
6923406 (0.219) (0.813) (0-234) (0.380) 
UK 35% -0.574 -0.043 2.814** 0.771 
(0.882) (0.424) (1.084) (0.668) 
Eyeglasses France 21% -2.006 1.867 0.005 -1.031 -0.025 0.471 
7084720 (1.715) (1.477) (0.399) (0.852) (1.010) (0.470) 
Italy 24% -2.275 1.241 -0.207 -0.820 -0.367 0.152 
(2.015) (2.289) (0.559) (1.303) (1.099) (0.607) 
Japan 15% -0.815*** 0.527 -0.395 -0.903** -0.041 0.179 
(0.233) (0.756) (0.951) (0.417) (0.754) (0.895) 
Silver halide Germany 21% -0.448*** 0.244 -0.442** 0.265 
paper (0.148) (0.200) (0.198) (0.263) 
7233030 Japan 55% 0.164 0.016 0.130 -0.001 
(0.130) (0.107) (0.259) (0.195) 
Grand pianos Japan 64% -0.276** -0.111 -0.289** -0.178 
7250320 (0.134) (0.137) (0.129) (0.175) 
Korea 24% -0.094 -0.058 -0.181 -0.246* 
(0.127) (0.097) (0.176) (0.130) 
exchange rate in the reduced form estimation. Like other literature the exchange rate pass-
through varies quite significantly across industries or source countries. However, we can see 
PT of higher than 100% for some exporters in some markets. This is puzzling. The 
simplicity of the model may preclude a clear interpretation of the effect of exchange rate 
changes on import prices. First, other omitted factors (or firm specific factors) that are 
systematically related to exchange rates may change elasticities over time. Second, there is 
no attempt to control for the U.S. domestic good prices of close substitutes. Finally, it is 
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possible that aggregation could bias the coefficients. Even though the 7-digit level TSUSA is 
compiled at the finest level of aggregation available, it may still not free entirely from the 
problem of aggregation. If there is heterogeneity within a product, changes in the 
composition of exports may be correlated with exchange rates if the elasticities of demand for 
varieties differ. 
This research manifests the importance of rival exchange rate effect. The 3SLS 
estimation indicates that 11 exporters from 10 commodity markets pass-through significandy 
for rival exchange rates, while the reduced form estimation indicates that 13 exporters from 
12 commodity markets show significant normal pass-through for rival exchange rates. Many 
studies have ignored the rival's behavior without considering strategic interactions in a 
market, hi some empirical studies, the effect of rival exchange rate is partially reflected by 
rival prices (usually domestic good price). However, there exists simultaneous bias problems 
because it fails to capture the strategic interaction. A major and indeed important factor for 
exchange rate PT has simply been missed. If rival's (third country) exchange rate is not 
considered, theoretical analyses are misconceived and empirical studies are biased and 
inefficient. Specifically, empirical tests based on a bilateral trade and exchange rate may face 
serious mis-specification problems. This finding will also generate an implication to studies 
with aggregated data, hi export price pass-through studies, an export price is affected by not 
only own trade weighted exchange rate but also rivals' exchange rates in each destination 
market. 
Another interesting finding is that, in 3SLS estimation, 8 exporters from 7 markets 
(i.e., Korea and U.K. in wall paper market, Japan in benzene market, Japan in polybutadiene 
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rubber market, Germany in Motor vehicle pumps market, Japan in front-ends loaders market, 
Sweden in chainsaws market, and Japan in relays market) did not show pass-through 
behaviors for own exchange rate but show significant pass-through behaviors for rival's 
exchange rate. This finding is more obvious from reduced form estimation which indicates 
11 exporters from 11 markets (i.e., Canada in beer, Japan in benzene, Germany in hydroxide, 
Japan in polybutadiene rubber, Japan in steel pipe, Germany in diesel engine, Germany in 
motor vehicle pump, Japan in front-end loaders, Sweden in chainsaws, Japan in relay, and 
Korea in grand piano) are affected by rival's exchange rate but not by own exchange rate. 
The more interesting thing is the fact that these exporters have relatively small market shares 
and are affected by the exchange rate of exporters who have the largest market shares. These 
exporters may have a strong tendency to follow a rival price. To match with a market leader 
price, these firms may try to offset price changes in the local currency induced by own cost 
shock (e.g., exchange rate fluctuation). This finding may reveal that own exchange rate pass-
through tends to be related positively with a market share. Also, this finding emphasizes the 
importance of the game structure in studying exchange rate pass-through. 
Finally, this study gives an interesting implication to import pass-through studies in 
both aggregated data and disaggregated data. In the import pass-through study, most 
previous studies used a trade weighted exchange rate. However, this study shows that, with 
the 3SLS estimation, 10 product markets' (i.e., wall paper, benzene, polybutadiene rubber, 
electrodes, motor vehicle pumps, front-end loaders, chainsaws, relays, ag. tractors, and grand 
pianos) prices are affected by only the exchange rate of the country which has the largest 
market share. Meanwhile, trade weighted exchange rates may be used as a good proxy in 
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only 6 markets (i.e., beer, hydroxide, steel pipe, shavers, spark plugs, and power cable), 
considering that all exchange rates affect prices . Reduced form estimations also indicate that 
13 product markets' (i.e., wall paper, benzene, hydroxide, polybutadiene rubber, electrodes, 
steel pipe, motor vehicle pumps, front-end loaders, chainsaws, shavers, relays, ag. tractors, 
and grand pianos) prices are affected by only the exchange rate of the country which has the 
largest market share while trade weighted exchange rates seem to work in only 2 markets 
(i.e., beer and power cable). Only, if all firms have considerable market powers, pass-
through estimations with a trade weighted exchange rate may be unbiased. 
IV.6 Conclusion 
This study which tests a simultaneous system with aggregated data at the finest level 
incorporated the strategic behaviors between firms in a market. The evidences across two 
estimations (3SLS and reduced from) indicate that price adjustment tends to pass through to 
the local currency price in the destination market, and that the pass-through rate are 
significantly different across countries and products. The study results confirm quite well to 
other research on traded good prices and exchange rates. However, this study manifests the 
importance of rival exchange rate. While the own exchange rate pass-through tends to be 
related inversely with market share, firms which have small market shares often pass through 
for the fluctuation of rival exchange rate. Particularly, some exporters who have small 
market shares pass through the change of rival exchange rate but not the change of own 
exchange rate. This study also gives some implications at the macro-level. First, in the 
export price pass-through studies, an export price is affected by not only own trade weighted 
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exchange rate across destination countries but also rivals' exchange rate in each destination 
market. This study also shows that, in many markets, prices are affected by only the 
exchange rate of the country which has the largest market share, rather than the trade 
weighted exchange rate. It tells that import pass-through studies using trade weight exchange 
rate may have a specification problem. 
The value added of this research is the approach to manifest strategic interaction and 
the level of industry detail. The next step of this study is to link with other destination 
markets to incorporate exporter's price discrimination behaviors across destination markets. 
For example, in the beer market, Netherlands exports not only to U.S. but also to Japan, 
Korea etc. Then the cost fimction will be inter-linked across destination markets. BCnetter 
(1989) studied the price discrimination behaviors across destination markets for U.S and 
Canada firms. If the broad data sample are available, the study of this line can be developed 
tremendously. Another interesting extension is to incorporate the exchange rate uncertainty 
issue. The variability of exchange rate may also affect on exchange rate pass-through. In 
incorporating the exchange rate uncertainty into empirical studies, the calculation of expected 
exchange rates and exchange rate variabilities may be a major step and obstacle. 
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V. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This dissertation consisted of three essays on exchange rate and price. In the first 
essay (chapter H), I studied the relationship between price leadership and exchange rate (cost, 
revenue) uncertainty. The essay investigated the incentives to lead and follow in a model in 
which exporting firms have the different degrees of exchange rate uncertainty. As exchange 
rate uncertainty increases, firms take a flexible strategy as a dominant strategy. Over certain 
ranges of exchange rate variability only one firm has a flexible strategy as its dominant 
strategy, and the other firm is induced to be a price leader, resulting in a dominant strategy 
Nash-equilibrium (price leader-follower equilibrium). Which firm will be the price leader 
depends on the mark-up and substitutability of products. In the general context, this study is 
also related to cost uncertainty. The particular attention of this research was also given to the 
implication of exchange rate variability for exchange rate pass-through. Exchange volatility 
may produce a structural break in the observed pass-through relationship, as the new game 
structure of the market may not be consistent with the historical rate of exchange rate pass-
through. Although the model is the same, the solution differs and the exchange rate pass-
through differs as the exchange rate variability changes. 
The second essay (chapter EH) focused more on brand loyalty. In many markets, 
consumers who have previously purchased from one firm have (or perceive) costs of 
switching to a competitor's product, even when the two firm's products are functionally 
identical. I explicitly analyzed the effect of rival exchange rate for different cases (perfect 
foresight for exchange rates, imperfect foresight for exchange rates, perfect capital mobility. 
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and imperfect capital mobility). In the case of the perfect foresight, the results added to those 
of Froot and Klemperer's (1989). First, exchange rate pass-through of greater than unity is 
possible in some cases. Second, if the change of own exchange rate is in the opposite 
direction to that of the rival's and is relatively small compared to the rival's, perverse 
exchange rate pass-through happens even with elastic demands. Also, it is possible that the 
firm chooses a perverse pass-through strategy even with a permanent exchange rate change. 
Third, the possibility of perverse PT in terms of a trade weighted exchange rate can not be 
eliminated either for permanent or for temporary shocks, even in the elastic demand area. In 
the case of the imperfect foresight, the exchange rate PT is affected by exchange rate 
uncertainty (covariance and variances of the exchange rates) as well as current own- and 
rival's bilateral exchange rates and expected future exchange rates. Due to brand loyalty, 
current price decisions will affect future profits through market shares. The expected future 
profit is affected by expected competition situations that depend on the interactive movement 
of futiure exchange rates. 
The last essay (chapter IV) tested the strategic behaviors between exporting firms 
with simultaneous estimation techniques (three stage least squares) using 7-digit TSUSA 
data. Exchange rate pass-through was estimated. The 3SLS and reduced form estimates 
were compared, and the effect of rival exchange rate was emphasized. Also, I manifested the 
problem of tests using a trade-weighted exchange rate. The evidences across two estimations 
(3SLS and reduced form) indicate that price adjustment tends to pass through to the local 
currency price in the destination market, and that the pass-through rate are significantly 
different across countries and products. The study results confirm quite well to other 
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research on traded good prices and exchange rates. However, this study manifests the 
importance of rival exchange rate. While the own exchange rate pass-through tends to be 
related positively with market share, firms that have small market shares often pass through 
for the fluctuation of rival exchange rate. Particularly, some exporters who have small 
market shares may pass through the change of rival exchange rate but not the change of own 
exchange rate. This study also gives some implications at the macro-level. First, in the 
export price pass-through studies, an export price is affected not only by own trade weighted 
exchange rate across destination countries but also by rivals' exchange rates in each 
destination market. This study also shows that, in many markets, prices are affected only by 
the exchange rate of the country which has the largest market share, rather than the trade 
weighted exchange rate. It tells that import pass-through studies using trade weighted 
exchange rate may have a specification problem. 
In this dissertation, firms' strategic interaction and pricing were studied under 
different conditions. Most importantly, this research emphasized the importance of market 
structure in exchange rate and price issues. The different specification of market structure 
changes the analytical form, raising dififerent empirical results and policy implications. Most 
existing theoretical and empirical studies on exchange rate pass-through did not pay an 
attention to the competition with goods produced in different source countries. 
The analysis developed here has implications not only to the micro-level questions, 
but also to the macro-level questions related to exchange rate. The existence of a stable 
relationship between exchange rates and traded goods prices on the various national markets 
is an essential ingredient in external adjustment processes and a major chaimel of 
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international transmission mechanisms. The role of exchange rate changes in balance-of-
payments adjustment processes is a major concern. In the macro-level, the effect of currency 
appreciation or depreciation on the trade balance can be analyzed more exactly under better 
understanding on individual market competition structures. Most literature has been 
performed on aggregate trade price data: aggregation tends to alter the statistical 
characteristics of individual price series. Hopefully, the present study will provide future 
researchers with some useful guidance in the study of some of issues associated with the 
response of prices to exchange rates. 
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